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Remember the Ladies and the 
Children Too 
CRAWFORD’S IMPACT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND CHILD ABUSE CASES 
Myrna Raeder† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Crawford’s1 testimonial approach has had a dramatic 
impact on domestic violence and child abuse cases.  This should 
come as no surprise, since Crawford’s view of the Confrontation 
Clause is grounded in the policies and practices in place in 
1791, without any regard for weighing or interpreting those 
underlying confrontation concerns through the lens of the 
modern era.  A purely historic approach to confrontation 
ignores the significant societal changes that have resulted in 
the criminalization of domestic violence and child abuse.  
Original intent focusing exclusively on 1791 retreats to a time 
when voices of outsiders, including women and children were 
not included in creating evidentiary or constitutional policy.2 
Even though Crawford involved a state conviction, the 
opinion does not even look to practice in 1868 when the 
Fourteenth Amendment “extended the strictures of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the States.”3  In 1791, the United 
States had no organized police force, let alone medical or 
forensic protocols in criminal cases.  Crawford also ignores the 
impact of videotape, two-way television, telephone, email, 
audiotape, typewriters, and computerized records in creating 
  
 † Professor, Southwestern University School of Law.  This article benefited 
from comments I received at Brooklyn Law School’s Crawford symposium.  © 2005 
Myrna Raeder. 
 1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 Feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory critique the absence of 
women and minorities from policymaking.  See, e.g., Myrna Raeder, Introduction to 
Symposium on Evidence Law: Race and Gender in Evidentiary Policy, and The New 
Courtroom, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 157, 158-63 (1999) (discussing literature). 
 3 Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000) (mentioning practice at both 
timeframes). 
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easy access to out-of-court statements that did not exist in 
1791.  Today, technology provides the means of producing all 
manner of hearsay that was not available in an earlier age.  
Extensive use of hearsay is now the norm, not the exception.  
Moreover, competency rules and evidentiary standards were 
much more restrictive then, resulting in an additional 
reliability check that does not exist in a world of expansive 
hearsay exceptions.  Ironically, in 1791, effective cross-
examination was often limited because the defendant either 
had no counsel or counsel’s cross-examination was restricted.4  
Jury trials of the time were quite short; often less than one 
hour.5  Thus, the attempt to impose the 1791 Confrontation 
Clause on the twenty-first century criminal justice system 
without consideration of the many societal differences was sure 
to create the havoc that Crawford has wrought. 
In domestic violence cases, a purely historic approach 
ignores the reality that in 1791 the “Rule of Thumb” was 
common: “as [the husband] is to answer for her misbehavior, 
the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of 
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to 
correct his apprentices or children.”6  Crawford’s originalist 
approach eschews the question of what the founding fathers 
would have thought of a world that espouses zero tolerance for 
domestic violence, one in which 911 protocols are routine, as 
are pro- or mandatory-arrest policies, no-drop prosecutions, 
criminal contempt convictions for violation of protective orders, 
expansive hearsay exceptions and in some states reporting 
requirements for medical personnel.  Instead, under Crawford, 
the confrontation right looks backward, not forward. 
Similarly, child abuse prosecutions were a rarity in 
1791.  Not only was molestation not recognized as a significant 
societal problem, but the old adage that children should be seen 
but not heard extended to the courtroom.  Even well into the 
twentieth century, statutes often disqualified children under 
seven from testifying, and in some states children as old as 
twelve could be barred.  In contrast, minimal competency rules 
now dominate, and some states permit unsworn testimony of 
  
 4 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: 
A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1197 n.140 (1996) (discussing 
sources indicating between a quarter and a third of defendants had counsel at the Old 
Bailey by the end of the eighteenth century). 
 5 John H. Langbein, Remarks to AALS Evidence Section (Jan. 2005). 
 6 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444 
(Chicago & London, Univ. of Chicago Press 1765).  
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child abuse victims,7 or simply declare child victims as 
competent to testify.8  Today, mandatory reporting 
requirements exist in all fifty states, eighteen of which include 
anyone who suspects child abuse.9  Therapeutic and forensic 
interviewing by doctors, social workers and psychologists who 
are employed by the state or referred by agents of the state are 
common.  In addition, child hearsay exceptions and expansive 
interpretation of firmly rooted exceptions routinely permit the 
voices of children to be heard, whether or not they testify.  Yet, 
the return to 1791 silences the voices of children who do not 
appear at trial, unless they were subject to prior cross-
examination or the right has been forfeited.   
Ironically, looking backwards to determine what is 
“testimonial” provides no more certainty than the earlier 
Roberts10 reliability test.  For example, one judge, trying to 
evaluate whether statements by a nontestifying child to her 
grandmother concerning sexual assault perpetrated upon her 
by a juvenile were testimonial, noted “[t]he quagmire we are 
left in, however, is that the Crawford Court does not pinpoint a 
specific definition of the amorphous concept of what 
‘testimonial statements’ might include.”11  Not only are courts 
reaching opposite conclusions on similar facts, but the very 
reach of the Confrontation Clause is in doubt.  On the one 
hand, if the Court ultimately defines testimonial narrowly, and 
also jettisons any confrontation test for nontestimonial 
hearsay, the defendant will have even less ability to exclude 
hearsay than under Roberts12 and its progeny.  On the other 
hand, if testimonial hearsay is interpreted broadly, the hearsay 
that is excluded may confound society’s ability to hold some 
types of perpetrators responsible for their crimes, unless 
forfeiture of the confrontation right is also viewed expansively. 
As a feminist who is also concerned about the 
defendant’s right to confrontation, I have long pondered the 
  
 7 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.605(2) (1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2) 
(McKinney 1999). 
 8 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3(c) (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86h (1999); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-410 (1999); see generally Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and 
the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017 (2000). 
 9 See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
INFORMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD 
MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS 3 (2002). 
 10 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 11 In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 12 Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.  
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proper balance to ensure that the voices of women and children 
are heard, without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to 
confront live complainants, and not just second hand witnesses.  
I face a tension between my desire to lower the incidence of 
domestic violence and child abuse and my view that 
testimonial hearsay should be interpreted broadly in light of 
technology and the adoption by states of expansive hearsay 
exceptions that make the government responsible for the 
existence of admissible hearsay.  While it is obvious that 
interrogation produces testimonial hearsay, there has been 
little, if any, discussion of the government’s role in creating the 
hearsay exceptions that permit private individuals to make 
accusations that in 1791 would not have been admissible.  In 
other words, it is not helpful to define testimonial statements 
by reference to rules that do not contemplate the admission of 
most hearsay that is currently received at trial.  Yet, Crawford 
did not ask how the drafters would have viewed the 
constitutionality of admitting of such legislatively approved 
hearsay in the absence of the declarant.  Thus, beyond the 
issue of 911 calls to the police is the admission of purely private 
statements that would not have seen the light of day in 1791.   
People v. Moscat,13 one of the early influential cases 
finding a 911 call by a domestic violence victim seeking rescue 
was not testimonial, astutely recognized that the historically 
grounded testimonial approach did not provide the urgent 
guidance needed to apply the Sixth Amendment to a twenty-
first century world.  However, my longstanding concern that 
cross-examination is a significant right that has been 
eviscerated by the Roberts approach, leads me to reject 
Moscat’s expansive exclusion of excited utterances from the 
protection of the Confrontation Clause.  Yet, the difficulty with 
any approach that broadly interprets testimonial statements is 
that under Crawford it silences the voices of women and 
children by regressing to a world that typically treated them as 
chattel.  While I am not as optimistic as Professor Mosteller 
that Crawford will eventually result in more pretrial cross-
examination and trial witnesses,14 I view this transition to a 
new mode of Confrontation Clause analysis as an opportunity 
to rethink how we approach domestic violence and child abuse 
cases. 
  
 13 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 14 See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and 
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 533-614 (2005). 
2005] REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO  315 
This essay critiques the testimonial approach, presents 
my view of how testimonial statements should be defined, and 
discusses current trends affecting domestic violence and child 
abuse litigation.  I also explore forfeiture, waiver, and opening 
the door to testimonial statements.  Rather than fighting 
Crawford, holding out for the most strained interpretations 
that permit the use of statements by denying their testimonial 
effect, I suggest embracing evidentiary creativity, exploring 
new hearsay exceptions for declarants who testify, determining 
whether Rule 404(b) is being adequately used,15 and expanding 
expert testimony to permit background about battering and 
child abuse.16  
More globally, I propose restructuring domestic violence 
prosecutions into separate tracks in order to devote scarce 
criminal justice resources to the most dangerous offenders.  
The Risky Violent Offender prosecutorial track would apply to 
cases resulting in death, rape or other serious physical injuries, 
weapons-based offenses, multiple victim abusers, defendants 
with previous convictions, and defendants who meet defined 
criteria of dangerousness.  Other crimes typically charged as 
misdemeanors would be further separated into a Diversionary 
and a Middle track for all other cases.  Finally, I suggest best 
practices that are most likely to permit child testimony. 
II. THE CRAWFORD FRAMEWORK 
A. Crawford’s Testimonial/Nontestimonial Divide 
As I have already alluded, my disagreement with the 
testimonial approach to confrontation is that the common law 
  
 15 I have long been opposed to outright propensity evidence in sexual abuse 
cases.  See Myrna S. Raeder, A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of 
Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995) (supporting resolution opposing Federal 
Rules of Evidence 413-415).  However, I support the use of Rule 404(b) in such cases.  
See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson 
and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1493 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, Simpson and 
Beyond]. 
 16 See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence 
Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003) [hereinafter Lininger, Evidentiary 
Issues]; Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005) 
[hereinafter Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The 
Role of Batterers’ Profiles and Expert “Social Framework” Background in Cases 
Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 152 (1997) [hereinafter 
Raeder, The Better Way]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of 
Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic 
Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, The Double-Edged 
Sword]; Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15.   
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in 1791, or even that of 1868, should not set the standard.  
Instead, the appropriate question is how the historic 
Confrontation Clause concerns would be interpreted in light of 
modern technology and context.  Just as the Eighth 
Amendment is interpreted according to evolving standards of 
decency,17 the Confrontation Clause should not be tied to a 
static framework.  In other words, the approach in Maryland v. 
Craig,18 a case permitting an accommodation to permit a child 
witness to testify out of the presence of the defendant, is more 
suited to interpreting the Sixth Amendment in situations never 
contemplated in 1791.  As Craig noted, “[w]e have accordingly 
interpreted the Confrontation Clause in a manner sensitive to 
its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of trial and the 
adversary process.”19  Craig was quite practical, citing Kirby v. 
United States20 for the proposition that “[i]t is scarcely 
necessary to say that to the rule that an accused is entitled to 
be confronted with witnesses against him the admission of 
dying declarations is an exception which arises from the 
necessity of the case.”21 
Thus, Craig permitted denial of face-to-face 
confrontation when “necessary to further an important public 
policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is 
otherwise assured.”22  The opinion held “that a State’s interest 
in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse 
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in 
some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in 
court,”23 a result not likely to have been reached in 1791.  While 
Craig may be discounted as not involving “core” confrontation 
values, it is unclear why originalism applies selectively to some 
parts of the amendment, and indeed only to some amendments. 
It is not a sufficient response for originalists to tell us to 
amend the Constitution if we don’t like where the doctrine 
leads us.  The power of the Constitution is that it is a living 
document.24  Crawford rejects that strength, and with it, the 
  
 17 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005). 
 18 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 19 Id. at 849. 
 20 174 U.S. 47 (1899). 
 21 Id. at 61. 
 22 497 U.S. at 850. 
 23 Id. at 853. 
 24 See generally Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science and 
the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist 
Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737 (2003). 
2005] REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO  317 
flexibility that is essential to applying old doctrine to new 
situations.  Obviously, the Court will be called upon to clarify 
its approach.  At that point, the winners and losers will clearly 
emerge, but in the meantime, we must adopt practices that 
provide the best opportunity for successfully prosecuting 
domestic violence and child abuse cases, while recognizing the 
renewed importance of cross-examination.25  
Undoubtedly, Crawford’s ambiguity was caused by the 
realpolitik of needing to obtain a majority, given that Justice 
Scalia’s previous forays into Confrontation Clause originalism 
were supported only by Justice Thomas.26  Thus, Crawford 
offers something for everyone.  It mentioned three potential 
standards: 
1. “[E]x parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent—that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 
that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially.”27 
2. “[E]xtrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions.”28 
3. “[S]tatements that were made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial.”29 
These definitions vary significantly, and the selection of 
one will have a major impact on the scope of the Confrontation 
  
 25 In the Roberts era, commentators, including myself, railed against the 
devaluation of cross-examination in a doctrinal approach based on reliability.  Now, 
prior cross-examination has not simply regained its earlier luster, but has become a 
rigid requirement for admission of testimonial statements by unavailable declarants.  
 26 See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 144 (1999). 
 27 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting Brief for 
Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
 28 Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, 
J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 29 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)). 
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Clause.  The first definition focuses on the declarant’s 
perspective in giving the statement, while the second gives 
confrontation the narrowest content.  Finally, the third appears 
to afford the most protection for defendants by imposing an 
objective witness standard.  Crawford did not choose which 
criteria to apply, offering the following guidance: 
1. Statements taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogations are testimonial under 
even a narrow standard.30 
2. “The involvement of government officers in 
the production of testimonial evidence presents 
the same risk, whether the officers are police or 
justices of the peace.  In sum, even if the Sixth 
Amendment is not solely concerned with 
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, 
and interrogations by law enforcement officers 
fall squarely within that class.”31 
3. Interrogation extends “not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on 
the part of the police (other than those normally 
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.”32 
As a result, the Court held that Sylvia Crawford’s 
“recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured 
police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.”33  
Regardless of definition or scope, Crawford will catch some 
statements to private individuals in its testimonial net.  
Historically, Cobham’s hearsay was not the only out of court 
statement introduced at Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial.34  Shouldn’t 
we be concerned about the statements of the pilot, Dyer, who 
repeated what a Portugese gentleman had told him about the 
King never being crowned, because Raleigh and Cobham were 
  
 30 Id. at 51. 
 31 Id. at 53. 
 32 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980) (cited in Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 53 n.4).  
 33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. 
 34 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the 
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100-01 
(1972). 
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going to cut his throat?35  This statement was made to a private 
individual, but was clearly accusatory, either from the 
perspective of the declarant or a reasonable observer.   
In the child abuse context, it is easy to posit examples of 
testimonial hearsay when a private individual acts as an agent 
or proxy for the government.  This might occur in mandatory 
reporting contexts or where a child welfare agency joins with 
the prosecution to investigate cases.  Arguably, some will view 
Idaho v. Wright36 as such a case.  “In Wright, the Court found 
that a defendant’s right to confrontation was violated by 
admission of statements made in part by a child declarant to a 
physician.”37  Professor Margaret Berger has noted that the 
Solicitor General admitted that the questioning in Wright was 
by an agent of the prosecution in his amicus brief in White v. 
Illinois,38 another case discussing confrontation concerns raised 
in a child abuse context: 
[T]he questioning in that case [Wright] occurred after the declarant 
had been taken into custody by the police, and the state court’s 
characterization of the questioning suggest that it was designed to 
develop evidence in a criminal case . . . .  The questioning therefore 
may be regarded as functionally equivalent to other forms of official 
interrogation that result in statements by a “witness.”39  
While I am obviously not a fan of the testimonial 
approach, now that it controls, I actually substantially agree 
with Professor Richard Friedman’s broad view of what is 
testimonial.40  Yet, so much of hearsay is accusatory in the 
colloquial understanding of that term, it is unlikely that the 
Court would adopt a view that would significantly change the 
way trials currently look.  In other words, a narrow 
interpretation of testimonial is more in keeping with the 
Court’s repeated admonition that the states are laboratories for 
social change, and its prior approval of all manner of “firmly 
rooted” hearsay.  However, Crawford has made clear that as to 
  
 35 Id.; The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 Howell’s State Trials 1, 25 (1603). 
 36 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 37 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 602 
(1992). 
 38 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 39 Berger, supra note 37, at 613 n.191 (quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28 n.18, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 
(1992) (No. 90-6113)). 
 40 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision 
Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2004). 
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the “core” concerns of the Confrontation Clause, a “broad 
modern hearsay exception” will not save a testimonial 
statement.41  
B. Why Nontestimonial Hearsay Should Not Be Freely 
Admitted at Trial 
Crawford offers even less guidance as to how courts 
should approach nontestimonial hearsay.  Like a seer of old, 
Justice Scalia obliquely pronounces: “Where nontestimonial 
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ 
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 
hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that 
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether.”42 
What does this mean?  If Roberts does not apply, 
regardless of whether a broad or narrow view of testimonial 
emerges, Crawford opens the possibility of large amounts of 
hearsay receiving no constitutional second-look at all.  Justice 
Scalia savaged Roberts’ reliability test in Crawford: “The 
[reliability] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to 
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation 
violations.  Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely 
subjective, concept.”43  Why would he leave open the possibility 
that Roberts and its progeny are still constitutionally 
appropriate, even to statements not at the core of 
Confrontation Clause concerns?  Again the cynical answer is to 
obtain a majority, but realistically, Roberts provides a cost-free 
pro forma stamp of approval for all firmly rooted hearsay of 
unavailable declarants.44  Only Wright provides any relief to 
defendants by subjecting nontraditional exceptions to a review 
for indicia of reliability.45  Yet, the Crawford majority opinion 
made no reference to Wright.  It is unlikely that Justice Scalia 
forgot about the case, since Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested 
that a simple reference to Wright could have explained the 
  
 41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56-57 n.7 (2004). 
 42 Id. at 68. 
 43 Id. at 63. 
 44 See, e.g., State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 484-85 (Neb. 2005), petition 
for cert. filed, No. 05-5981 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2005).  
 45 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990). 
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reversal in Crawford without any need for restructuring the 
Confrontation Clause analysis.46  
There is a more nuanced possibility for the absence of 
Wright in the majority opinion.  The only holding questioned by 
Crawford was White v. Illinois,47 in which some of the admitted 
hearsay included a child’s statement to an officer.48  In other 
words, none of the other cases reached an incorrect result, even 
though their reliance on Roberts’ framework was wrong.  
Therefore, because Wright was not specifically overruled, its 
holding, reversing a conviction where a child’s statements to a 
doctor were admitted at trial,49 is still good law.  Since the 
statements were made to a private individual, the only 
rationale for supporting reversal appears to be that 
nontraditional hearsay is subject to a check for reliability.  
However, if Wright is recharacterized as testimonial due to the 
police selecting the physician, the basis for its holding that 
nontraditional hearsay must be subject to a separate reliability 
review could be rejected, like the Roberts rationale, without 
having to overrule the case.  This recharacterization would 
accord with the position taken by the Solicitor General’s 
previously referenced amicus brief in White.50  While such an 
approach would expand the range of testimonial statements, 
particularly in child hearsay cases, it would also eliminate the 
argument that Supreme Court precedent requires a Sixth 
Amendment review of nontestimonial hearsay.   
While I agree with Crawford’s recognition that 
confrontation is primarily a procedural right,51 and 
acknowledge that reliability tends to be more a due process 
concern, it is imperative to retain a reliability review given a 
testimonial approach.  First, there is a vast difference between 
trial practice in 1791 compared to today.  Common law judges 
distrusted jurors and restricted access to evidence.  They had 
  
 46 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). 
 47 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 48 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
 49 Wright, 497 U.S. at 827 (“Given the presumption of inadmissibility 
accorded accusatory hearsay statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, we agree with the court below that the State has failed to show that 
the younger daughter’s incriminating statements to the pediatrician possessed 
sufficient ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the Confrontation 
Clause to overcome that presumption.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 50 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113)). 
 51 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
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stricter competency rules, and fewer hearsay exceptions.52  
Early Supreme Court cases recognized how the fear of perjury 
impacted trial practice.  For example, Benson v. United States 
posited that “the theory of the common law was to admit to the 
witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the 
sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free 
from any of the temptations of interest.  The courts were afraid 
to trust the intelligence of jurors.”53 
Post-Crawford, it has been noted that Roberts and its 
progeny “seem to be alive and well as to nontestimonial 
hearsay.”54  As previously mentioned, to the extent that the 
hearsay is introduced pursuant to a firmly rooted exception, 
the result is an automatic pass, so there is no incentive to 
reject the test.  Even when Wright applies, reversals are not 
assured.55  But assuming that reliability is required, are courts 
bound by the White/Wright definition, or can Crawford’s 
extended dalliance with history be used to support a reliability 
check with some bite?  For years, I have contended that 
nontraditional uses of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions must be 
analyzed under Wright not White.56  This would result in 
nontraditional hearsay being subject to a reliability check, 
regardless of which exception allowed for its admission.  
Certainly the reference to White in Crawford implies that for 
confrontation purposes, flexible interpretations of excited 
utterances do not satisfy the exception as understood in 1791.57  
Therefore, any argument that a true excited utterance is 
  
 52 See, e.g., id. at 56; Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 310 (1880); Queen 
v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1813). 
 53 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892). 
 54 Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *6 (Tex. App. 
May 19, 2005).  See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2005); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 
75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 
200-01 (Conn. 2004); Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80 (Ga. 2004); State v. Vaught, 
682 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Neb. 2004).   
 55 Compare People v. Garrison, 109 P.3d 1009, 1013 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (no 
reversal for statement admitted under residual exception), with Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 
738, 745 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (reversal where declaration against interest to friend 
was admitted). 
 56 See Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catch-alls on Criminal Defendants: 
Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LOY. L.A. REV. 925, 
941-42 (1992); Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and 
Creating a More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2003); Myrna S. Raeder, White’s Effect on the Right to 
Confront One’s Accuser, 7 CRIM. JUST. 2, 56 (1993). 
 57 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004). 
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nontestimonial, even when made to the police, would not save a 
modern excited utterance. 
If the concerns underlying Wright still resonate with the 
Court, several possible reliability approaches spring to mind:  
(1) retain Wright as is; (2) retain Wright, but permit 
corroboration; or (3) adopt a modified historic approach that 
would permit testimonial hearsay to the extent it would have 
met a hearsay exception in 1791.  The approach that would 
cause the least dislocation is to retain Wright as is.  Since 
Crawford encourages experimentation by states to create more 
exceptions so long as the declarant testifies or the statement is 
nontestimonial,58 the Court might hesitate jettisoning Wright.  
In other words, without any requirement of trustworthiness, a 
strict prosecutorial restraint view of Crawford is more likely to 
result in trials that include substantial amounts of potentially 
unreliable nontestimonial evidence, whether offered under ad 
hoc hearsay exceptions or expansively interpreted traditional 
exceptions.   
However, Wright has been thoroughly criticized for 
excluding corroboration from the confrontation mix, since 
corroboration appears to support reliability, and as a practical 
matter, harmless error analysis will encompass such evidence.  
Because Crawford tells us that nontestimonial hearsay does 
not concern core confrontation values, slightly modifying the 
existing test would not require historic justification.  Moreover, 
the rejection of corroboration in Wright appeared based on 
hearsay analysis.59  Now that confrontation has been decoupled 
from hearsay, the rationale to reject corroboration is lessened.  
Alternatively, because the reliability check is really based on 
due process rather than confrontation grounds, corroboration 
should not be excluded.  However, this latter justification 
would require the Court to provide an explanation of what due 
process means in the trial process, a topic it has approached 
somewhat inconsistently on a case by case basis in the context 
of a defendant’s right to present a defense.60  
  
 58 See id. at 56, n.7 (noting that testimonial hearsay could not be saved by a 
broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in 
nontestimonial circumstances). 
 59 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 806 (1990). 
 60 Compare Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 38 (1996) (plurality approach 
to due process), with Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (due process 
includes “[t]he rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in 
one’s own behalf”).  See also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315-17 (1998). 
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I am hopeful that Crawford’s progeny may permit more 
flexibility in interpretation than its originalism suggests, 
because it is unclear whether all of the justices in the Crawford 
majority fully considered the potential consequences of a 
testimonial approach for trial practice; particularly, the 
decreased ability to obtain convictions where neither the state 
nor the defendant has engaged in any misconduct resulting in 
the unavailability of the declarant.  The more pragmatic 
justices might balk at a broad interpretation of testimonial that 
would result in an absolute rule that such evidence would be 
excluded whenever the declarant is unavailable, but they 
might equally look askance at providing an automatic pass for 
all other hearsay.  Such views could presage a very narrow 
reading of testimonial, but might also suggest a compromise 
that retreats from an absolutist version of the confrontation 
right to one that also permits otherwise testimonial hearsay 
that was available in 1791.  
For example, Justice Scalia indicates that excited 
utterances were interpreted very narrowly as applying to res 
gestae, not after the fact descriptions.61  The other few existing 
exceptions would have also been confined to the type of 
information that justified the theoretical underpinning for the 
rule, uncorrupted by the modern shift toward liberal admission 
of hearsay.  Permitting such hearsay, regardless of cross-
examination, might actually encourage states to narrowly 
interpret their hearsay exceptions, requiring nontraditional 
hearsay to be admitted by exceptions that often require 
trustworthiness, even if the Court does not ultimately retain a 
reliability check for nontestimonial hearsay.  For example, 
State v. Branch62 recently narrowly construed excited 
utterances to exclude a statement by a child in response to a 
question by police.  Branch noted, “our analysis is informed by 
the principles undergirding the Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence of our federal and state constitutions.”63  While it 
may be naïve to believe that the pendulum is finally swinging 
back to less hearsay after decades favoring liberal admission of 
out of court statements, Branch may presage a rethinking 
about hearsay analysis, not simply confrontation.64  
  
 61 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
 62 865 A.2d 673, 688-90 (N.J. 2005). 
 63 Id. at 690. 
 64 See also United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 901 (6th Cir. 2005) (not an 
excited utterance where no proof of the amount of time between the incident and the 
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Another wild card that is just beginning to surface is the 
role of state constitutions in regulating nontestimonial 
hearsay.  Whether or not reliability is required under the 
federal constitution, a state can always provide more protection 
for criminal defendants under its own constitution, and in a 
post-Crawford world, this need not be linked to a pro forma 
pass for firmly rooted hearsay. 
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
A. The Empirical Evidence Concerning Domestic Violence 
While the aggressive prosecution of batterers has 
undoubtedly played a significant role in nearly halving 
nonfatal intimate violence against women between 1993 and 
2001,65 the numbers are still distressing, and some of the 
decline in aggravated assaults may be illusory.66  Intimate 
partner violence comprised 20% of violent crime against women 
in 2001,67 and family violence accounted for about 1 in 10 of all 
violent victimizations from 1993-2002.68  In 1993, women were 
victimized in approximately 1.1 million non-fatal violent 
crimes.69  By 2001, this figure declined to 588,490 incidents.70  
Simple assault comprised nearly 72% of the total.71  The 
number of women killed yearly by their intimates fell less 
dramatically during that timeframe to 1247 from 1581.72  An 
analysis of 2002 homicide data found that for female victims 
  
911 call, and noting that use of the exceptions must be closely scrutinized to protect the 
defendant’s right to confront accusers); People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 319 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2004) (not an excited utterance where a five minute discussion with backup officer 
took place before statement was made). 
 65 See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 2 (NCJ 197838) (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. 
 66 See, e.g., Jill Leovy, LAPD Gave Misleading Crime Data, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2005, at B1 (correcting previous error consolidating all domestic assaults, 
regardless of whether aggravated or simple, substantially overstated decline in violent 
crime). 
 67 RENNISON, supra note 65, at 1. 
 68 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FAMILY VIOLENCE 
STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 1 (NCJ 207846) 
(June 2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.  It should be 
noted that family violence is a broader term than domestic violence and includes all 
types of violent crime committed by an offender who is related to the victim either 
biologically or legally, through marriage or adoption. 
 69 RENNISON, supra note 65, at 1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at Table 1. 
 72 Id. at 2. 
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who knew their killers, 61% were wives or intimate 
acquaintances of their killers.73  
Statistics from other sources are even higher, indicating 
that approximately one in five women is victimized 
repeatedly.74  While the extent of battering during pregnancy is 
not clear, homicide is the second leading cause of death in 
pregnant women.75  According to the 2000 National Violence 
Against Women Survey, 25% of women and 8% of men are 
subject to violence by an intimate during their lifetime.76  That 
survey estimated that approximately 1.5 million women are 
battered or raped annually by their partners,77 and about 1/3 of 
these women are injured enough to require medical 
treatment.78  Twenty percent of women, moreover, who need 
treatment are pregnant at the time.79  Finally, a large amount 
of intimate partner victimizations are not reported to the 
police.80  Some claim that as much of 50% of domestic violence 
goes unreported.81 
B. The Criminalization of Domestic Violence  
Coinciding with the emergence of feminism, the 
Battered Women’s Movement became prominent in the 1970s 
and by the 1990s resulted in significant statutory and policy 
changes to ensure the prosecution of domestic violence crimes, 
provide shelters for battered women and their children, and 
modify self-defense definitions to include women who kill their 
  
 73 VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
2002 HOMICIDE DATA 7 (2004), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2004.pdf. 
 74 See, e.g., Tri-Town Council on Youth and Family Services, 
http://tritowncouncil.org/DOMESTICVIOLENCE.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005). 
 75 Jeani Chang et al., Homicide: A Leading Cause of Injury Deaths Among 
Pregnant and Postpartum Women in the United States, 1991-1999, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 471 (2005), abstract at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstaract/95/3/471.  
 76 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. AND THE 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, 
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (NCJ 183781) 
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at v. 
 79 Aili Mari Tripp & Ladan Affi, Domestic Violence in a Cultural Context, 27 
FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (Fall 2004). 
 80 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXTENT, 
NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 49 (NCJ 181867) (2000). 
 81 CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (NCJ 178247) (2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf. 
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batterers.82  Previously, domestic violence calls often resulted 
in few arrests and prosecutions as well as low conviction rates.  
In addition, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)83 was 
passed, and since 1995, its office within the Department of 
Justice has provided more than $1 billion in grants “to train 
personnel, establish specialized domestic violence and sexual 
assault units, assist victims of violence, and hold perpetrators 
accountable.”84 Funding for studies and programs aimed at 
reducing domestic violence has also been provided.   
Newly adopted police, prosecutorial and judicial 
practices dramatically transformed domestic violence litigation 
during the last twenty years.85  Warrantless misdemeanor 
arrests are now the rule.  Pro arrest or mandatory arrest 
policies are common, as are no-drop prosecutions, regardless of 
any contrary wishes of complainants.  Protective orders are 
routinely, though not invariably, enforced by criminal 
contempt.86  In some urban jurisdictions, domestic violence 
courts exist, a number of which consolidate all related cases 
regardless of whether brought in civil, criminal or in juvenile 
court.87  Similarly, in some urban settings, prosecutorial offices 
have made domestic violence a priority, assigning prosecutors 
and advocates to domestic violence units.88  Typically, courts 
and prosecutorial offices specializing in domestic violence have 
  
 82 See generally Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 16; Raeder, 
Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15. 
 83 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 
 84 Office on Violence Against Women, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/ 
about.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). 
 85 See generally Phyllis Goldfarb, Intimacy and Injury: Legal Interventions for 
Battered Women, in THE HANDBOOK OF WOMEN, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (Andrea 
Barnes ed., 2005). 
 86 Horror stories can still occur.  See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 
125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) (husband murdered his three children after police repeatedly 
failed to respond to estranged wife’s complaints that he had violated a protective order; 
Court found no basis for civil rights liability).  
 87 See, e.g., Judge Lowell D. Castleton et al., Ada County Family Violence 
Court: Shaping the Means to Better the Result, 39 FAM. L.Q. 27 (Spring 2005); see 
generally EMILY SACK, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES (2002), available at 
http://endabuse.org/programs/healthcare/files/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf; Jennifer 
Thompson, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing a 
Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court Programs, 
56 ME. L. REV. 407 (2004). 
 88 See generally Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle 
for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1673 (2004). 
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produced higher conviction rates in comparison to jurisdictions 
where domestic violence is treated like any other assault.89 
It became obvious relatively quickly in the fight against 
domestic violence that the major impediment to obtaining 
convictions was that the majority of battered women did not 
want to testify.  Even when they appeared at trial, they often 
recanted their accusations and generally were bad witnesses, 
resulting in relatively few convictions.90  As a result, aided by 
the Roberts approach to confrontation, prosecutors developed 
what is known somewhat misleadingly as “evidence based” or 
“victimless” prosecutions.91  In other words, hearsay exceptions 
for excited utterances, medical statements, or ad hoc exceptions 
for trustworthy hearsay permitted prosecution in the absence 
of the victim through the testimony of police and medical 
personnel.  Sometimes statements made in application for 
protective orders would be introduced, not simply the order 
itself.92  Cases relied on these second-hand witnesses, and also 
included photographs of injuries, medical testimony, and in 
some jurisdictions expansive use of prior acts of domestic 
violence offered under Rule 404(b) or domestic violence 
exceptions.  On occasion, a Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) 
expert would explain why the woman stayed with her batterer 
or had recanted her accusatory statements, thereby 
rehabilitating the credibility of the victim who had testified or 
whose hearsay had been impeached by her prior inconsistent 
statements. 
In retrospect, this effort to hold batterers accountable 
for their actions did not create uniformly good results for 
battered women.  In some instances, women have virtually 
been forced to testify or face jail under material witness or 
bench warrants when they ignore subpoenas,93 and both the 
  
 89 See id. at 1673-74. 
 90 See, e.g., JOANNE BELKNAP & DEE L.R. GRAHAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN 
AREA 11 (NCJ 202564), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE 
PROFESSIONALS (Barbara E. Smith ed., Dec. 2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 768-69. 
 91 See generally Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of 
Victimless Prosecution?, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301 (2005). 
 92 See People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct.  2004) (holding 
that statements made by a domestic violence victim in an order of protection, which 
were introduced at trial, were testimonial and violated the Constitution’s 
Confrontation Clause). 
 93 See, e.g., Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should 
Victims be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 383, 402 (2001). 
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effect and the effectiveness of such policies began to be 
questioned.94  In other words, the bottom line is that the vast 
majority of female domestic violence victims still do not want to 
prosecute their batterers.  While batterers were getting 
convicted in higher percentages due to the witness-lite/hearsay-
heavy approach, particularly in jurisdictions with domestic 
violence courts, some battered women’s advocates starting 
noticing more ominous trends.  Besides more women being 
arrested for domestic violence and judges granting mutual 
protective orders,95 women were being charged criminally for 
endangering their children who witnessed their abuse; and 
even when they were not charged, their children might be 
removed from the home and placed in foster care.96  A few 
researchers concluded that the empirical evidence indicated 
that some classes of women were put at greater risk by 
aggressive prosecution, particularly in misdemeanor cases 
where defendants were released pretrial, or received probation 
or short sentences.97 
  
 94 See, e.g., MARY A. FINN, EFFECTS OF VICTIMS’ EXPERIENCES WITH 
PROSECUTORS ON VICTIM EMPOWERMENT AND RE-OCCURRENCE OF INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE (NCJ 202983) (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/202983.pdf; see also NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, POLICY POSITIONS ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (adopted Oct. 23, 2004) (recommending discretionary policies, 
rather than written no drop policies), available at http://www.ndaa.org/newsroom/ 
index.html. 
 95 See, e.g., Sandy Chestnut, The Practice of Dual Arrests in Domestic 
Violence Situations: Does It Accomplish Anything?, 70 MISS. L.J. 971 (2001); Leigh 
Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of 
Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 23-24 (2004); 
Andrea D. Lyon , Comment, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Examination of Arrest 
and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (1999); Sack, supra note 88. 
 96 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2004) 
(clarifying that neglect is not established solely when a child has witnessed her 
mother’s domestic abuse and therefore routine filing of neglect on this ground was 
unjustified).  See also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: 
The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 
(2004); FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH (updated August 2004), available at http://endabuse.org/programs/healthcare/ 
files/Pediatric.pdf; Beth A. Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System: 
Racism, Patriarchy, and the Presumptive Removal of Children from Victims of 
Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1131 (2005); Joan S. 
Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding 
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
657, 667 (2003). 
 97 See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law: 
Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1 (1992).  See also Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution 
Policies: Prioritizing Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 467 n.3-4 (2003); Deborah Epstein, 
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Moreover, large percentages of women continued to live 
with their batterers.  While I believe the get-tough domestic 
violence policies contributed to the overall decrease in domestic 
homicides and decreasing incidents of domestic violence, the 
one-size-fits-all approach clearly disadvantaged some women, 
disempowered others and did not uniformly lead to lesser risks 
of violence. 
C. Post-Crawford Realities in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions 
Crawford brought trials without complainants to an 
abrupt halt.  Generally, prosecutors estimate that 
approximately 80% of victims are uncooperative.98  Thus, in 
Crawford’s wake, some localities were reportedly dropping 50% 
of domestic violence cases.99  Indeed, a recent survey of 
prosecutors in several jurisdictions by Professor Lininger 
disclosed significant difficulties in prosecuting domestic 
violence cases after Crawford.100  Unsurprisingly, a number of 
domestic violence cases were reversed because testimonial 
hearsay had been introduced.101  However, an even more 
dramatic impact is the anecdotal view that many domestic 
violence cases are no longer being prosecuted because of their 
perceived difficulty to win after Crawford.102 
We are unlikely to see a return of pure “evidence based” 
trials.  Despite the hopes of some, we cannot ignore the 
elephant in the room.  While not every statement of an absent 
domestic violence victim will be excluded, enough will be to 
  
Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (discussing batterers).  Cf. Laura Dugan et al., Exposure 
Reduction or Retailiation? The Effects of Domestic Violence Resources on Intimate-
Partner Homicide, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 169, 191-92 (2003) (finding aggressive 
prosecutorial policies lead to fewer deaths, except that deaths of white females increase 
when policies state a willingness to prosecute violators of protective orders). 
 98 See Lininger, Evidentiary Issues, supra note 16 (cited by the Court of 
Appeals decisions in Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807 (D.C. 2005), vacated by 
In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005) (en banc), and Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 
965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005)). 
 99 Robert Tharp, Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test:  Ruling that 
Suspects Can Confront Accusers Scares Some Victims from Court, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, July 5, 2004, at 1A. 
 100 See generally Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 750. 
 101 See, e.g., State v. Livanavage, No. LC2003-000903-001 DT, 2005 WL 
947879, at *3 (Ariz. Super. Jan. 24, 2005); Stancil, 866 A.2d at 813. 
 102 Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 750; Chris Hutton, Sir 
Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-vamps Two Decades of Confrontation 
Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 66 (2005). 
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require a reassessment of current practices.  In retrospect, such 
an examination may prove beneficial to the integrity of the 
criminal justice system as well as to defendants, and also 
provides an opportunity to revisit the issues that are important 
to battered women.  For example, one could critique pre-
Crawford prosecutors as taking the easy way out and 
denigrating the role that cross-examination of live witnesses 
plays in the criminal justice system.  Why bother dealing with 
difficult witnesses whose credibility might be questioned when 
hearsay and secondary evidence wins cases that might be lost if 
the complainant actually testified?  Yet, the absence of key 
witnesses is in conflict with the precept that confrontation 
“contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice 
in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness 
prevails.”103  We do not want to foster the perception that 
domestic violence cases provide second hand justice by second 
hand witnesses. 
Moreover, domestic violence trials with absent 
complainants were viewed by some as producing problematic 
results for families.  Court appearances, jail time, and a 
conviction might interfere with the batterer’s employment and 
housing opportunities, lessening his crucial role in providing 
financial sustenance to the family, without necessarily 
lowering the likelihood that the batterer would reoffend.  The 
goal was not to see the batterer punished, but to stop the 
violence and, where feasible, to maintain family unity.  In 
contrast, for some women’s advocates, the focus on family unity 
was seen as part of the problem, not the solution.104 
In any event, post-Crawford, more effort will be 
necessary to obtain victim cooperation.  Failing cooperation, 
prosecutors will have to assign more resources to obtaining 
other witnesses or sources of admissible evidence.  For 
example, jailhouse conversations may contain admissions of 
the defendant or be useful under a forfeiture theory if the 
victim refuses to testify.  A few post-Crawford cases also 
appear to carefully scrutinize proffers of unavailability 
required by hearsay exceptions when the prosecutor attempts 
  
 103 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 
530, 540 (1986)). 
 104 See, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness, and Redemption, 11 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 921, 946 (2003) (noting that clergy would often counsel 
women to return to their batterers in order to preserve family unity). 
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to introduce nontestimonial hearsay.105  Thus, close enough for 
government work may not be good enough to demonstrate a 
good faith attempt to produce the declarant. 
IV. EXCITED UTTERANCES—THE WORKHORSE OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES 
A. Categorical Exclusion Versus Case-by-Case Analysis 
A large percentage of the hearsay admitted in domestic 
violence cases is offered as excited utterances of absent 
complainants.  Many of these statements are made to law 
enforcement either via 911 calls, in person as volunteered 
statements to officers arriving at the scene, or as a result of 
questioning, either at the scene or later.  Because bright line 
rules make a judge’s work easier and the law more predictable, 
one immediate response to Crawford has been to view excited 
utterances categorically.106  This appears to assume they would 
all be nontestimonial, though in the case of 911 calls, one might 
argue the opposite result is more appropriate.  Either way, the 
difficulty with the categorical approach is how to define the 
categories.  A host of possibilities exist, including: 
1. All excited utterances volunteered to officers 
who were on routine patrol. 
2. All excited utterances made in response to 
officers securing a crime scene. 
3. All excited utterances made during a 
preliminary investigation. 
4. All excited utterances made via 911 calls 
while a crime is in progress. 
5. All excited utterances not made at the station 
or otherwise formalized by audio or videotape. 
6. All excited utterances that would meet the 
narrow definition of what was permitted in 1791: 
res gestae, not a narrative of a past occurrence. 
  
 105 See, e.g., People v. Cloud, No. D042386, 2004 WL 1895022 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 25, 2004). 
 106 See, e.g., People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004). 
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7. Res gestae only to officers arriving at a crime 
scene. 
8. All excited utterances as determined by state 
law. 
As Professor Mosteller suggests, indicating the range of 
possibilities demonstrates the unhelpfulness of this approach 
given the myriad of factual settings.107  The argument favoring 
automatic categorization of excited utterances as 
nontestimonial considers it inherently contradictory to view 
excited utterances as testimonial.  The Indiana Court of 
Appeals explained this point in Hammon:108 
[T]he very concept of an ‘excited utterance’ is such that it is difficult 
to perceive how such a statement could ever be ‘testimonial.’  ‘The 
underlying rationale of the excited utterance exception is that such a 
declaration from one who has recently suffered an overpowering 
experience is likely to be truthful.’  To be admissible, an exited 
utterance ‘must be unrehearsed and made while still under the 
stress of excitement from the startling event.’  ‘The heart of the 
inquiry is whether the declarants had the time for reflection and 
deliberation.’  An unrehearsed statement made without time for 
reflection or deliberation, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is 
not ‘testimonial’ in that such a statement, by definition, has not been 
made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.109 
Categorical exclusion of excited utterances was first 
suggested in People v. Moscat,110 an early post-Crawford 911 
case that has become influential, despite later criticism that 
the decision played fast and loose with the facts in the case.111  
A number of post-Crawford cases treat exited utterances 
categorically.112  While this approach has simplicity in its favor, 
  
 107 See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 567-68 (providing examples and discussion 
of police questioning practices, indicating that a model based structured questioning is 
not serviceable). 
 108 Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 109 See id. at 952-53 (internal citations omitted).  The Indiana Supreme Court 
rejected this all or nothing approach, and vacated the opinion in Hammon v. State, 829 
N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005). 
 110 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (911 call is part of the criminal 
incident itself and qualifies as an excited utterance because the caller had no 
opportunity to reflect and falsify account of events).  See also People v. Corella, 18 
Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 776-77 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 111 Sabrina Tavernise, Legal Precedent Doesn’t Let Facts Stand in the Way, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A1.  
 112 See, e.g., Anderson v. State 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); 
State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Jan. 27, 2005) (juveniles flagged down officer; “Because an excited utterance is a 
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it ignores the fact that many modern excited utterances are 
broader than excited utterances of yore.  It also ignores the 
context in which the statement was made, which seems 
antithetical to Crawford. 
A growing number of courts now appear to agree that 
excited utterances cannot be excluded automatically from 
confrontation review.113  For example, the court in 
Commonwealth v. Gray114 relied on the rationale first raised by 
Lopez v. State115 to hold that a statement does not lose its 
character as testimonial merely because the declarant was 
excited at the time it was made.  Lopez recognized that while 
excited utterances are likely to be reliable, “under Crawford, 
reliability has no bearing on whether a statement was 
testimonial.  Some testimonial statements are reliable and 
others are not.”116   
Lopez explained its reasoning as follows: 
a startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a 
police officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement 
is a form of accusation that will be used against the suspect.  In this 
situation, the statement does not lose its character as a testimonial 
statement merely because the declarant was excited at the time it 
was made.117  
Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Stancil v. United 
States118 refused to “automatically” exclude all excited 
utterances from the class of testimonial statements following 
the rationale in Lopez. 
  
reactionary event of the senses made without reflection or deliberation, it cannot be 
testimonial in that such a statement has not been made in contemplation of its use in a 
future trial.”); People v. Spade, No. A105918, 2005 WL 240867, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 
28, 2005) (“In our view, Crawford is inapplicable to this case because spontaneous 
statements made to a responding officer are not ‘testimonial’ in nature.”); State v. 
Cannaday, No. 04AP-109, 2005 WL 736583, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005) 
(expanding this view even further in finding that Crawford does not apply to “common-
law exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterances.”); see also discussion of 
conflicting case law on this issue in Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 453. 
 113 See, e.g., Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 453; State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 
811 (Minn. 2005); State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2005) (some excited 
utterances are testimonial, others are not), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-5981 (Aug. 19, 
2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005) (911 cases should be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis); Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 575-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2005); State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631, 638-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
 114 867 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
 115 888 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 116 Id. at 699. 
 117 Id. at 699-700. 
 118 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005), vacated by In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 
1186 (D.C. 2005) (en banc). 
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The case-by-case analysis appears to be more doctrinally 
sound than automatic exclusion, particularly since excited 
utterances were extremely limited in 1791, unlike today, as 
Justice Scalia mentioned, when questioning whether White’s 
holding was sound.119  In White, the statement made by the 
child to the police officer occurred after the incident, and after 
disclosures to the babysitter and the mother.120  Thus, Justice 
Scalia implicitly relied on a case-by-case approach in his 
discussion.  Moreover, in Siler v. Ohio,121 the Supreme Court 
vacated a conviction resting on the admission of an excited 
utterance by a child, and remanded for further consideration in 
light of Crawford, a result that belies the notion that a 
categorical exclusion for excited utterances is inherent in the 
Crawford analysis. 
Applying Crawford on a case-by-case basis to determine 
the definition of testimonial has been described as a “grueling 
job.”122  Ironically, the case-by-case approach does not assure 
how the court will rule in an individual case, because in light of 
the expansion of the excited utterance exception, its 
testimonial nature depends on the circumstances in which the 
particular statement was made.  Indeed, when such statements 
are made in person by declarants to police officers, they should 
be scrutinized carefully to determine if and when the 
statements morph from volunteered cries for help to products 
of police interrogation. 
Moreover, Crawford’s case specific analysis appears to 
ensure that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment definition of what 
is testimonial will diverge.  Crawford provides a reference to 
Rhode Island v. Innis123 for the proposition that interrogation is 
intended in its colloquial sense.124  In this context, such a 
reference should be interpreted to mean that custodial 
interrogation a la Miranda v. Arizona125 is not required.  Such a 
distinction is important since most of the police questioning 
related to excited utterances in domestic violence cases is 
neither aimed at suspects, nor custodial.  For example, in 
  
 119 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004). 
 120 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1992). 
 121 125 S. Ct. 671 (2004). 
 122 Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *4 (Tex. Crim. 
App. May 19, 2005). 
 123 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 124 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. 
 125 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). 
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People v. Dennison,126 a pre-Crawford case, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that “an on-the-scene investigation, or 
questioning which enables an officer to determine what has 
happened and who has been injured, is not an interrogation 
under Miranda or its progeny.”127  If custodial questioning is 
required, none of these statements would be testimonial, unless 
the Court adopted a broader definition that treated traditional 
custodial interrogation as only one way of producing an 
extrajudicial statement given to the police. 
Some prosecutors are already arguing that custodial 
questioning is a prerequisite for testimonial statements.  
Limiting the confrontation right to custodial interrogation 
would provide little protection to core Confrontation Clause 
concerns.  Miranda is of relatively recent vintage, and while 
constitutionally based,128 it cannot dictate the contours of a 
right based on different values.  Miranda provides a bright line 
rule for law enforcement practices, while Crawford is a trial 
right enforced by lawyers and judges.  Some courts have 
recognized that the terms “interrogation” and “testimonial” 
may be quite different for Confrontation Clause purposes post-
Crawford, than when used in other contexts.129 
B. Lack of Formality Does Not Preclude an Excited 
Utterance from Being Testimonial 
Lack of formality is sometimes mentioned as a separate 
reason for treating excited utterances as not being testimonial.  
Under this rationale, Crawford only applies to police 
interrogations made as part of “a relatively formal 
investigation where a trial is contemplated.”130  Thus, where 
the victim had just been shot, and the police were trying to 
learn the circumstances of the shooting, the statements were 
admitted, because “[n]o suspect was under arrest, and the 
police had not yet determined whether a crime had been 
committed.  The interviews with Shufford [the victim] were not 
recorded, and there was no ‘structured police questioning.’”131  
  
 126 918 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1996). 
 127 Id. at 1116. 
 128 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
 129 See, e.g., State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 481-82 (Neb. 2005). 
 130 People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 131 People v. Compton, No. B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 26, 2005) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004)). 
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In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Stancil v. United States 
rejected a formality requirement, relying on Crawford’s 
discussion that suggested interrogation included any 
questioning in a structured environment, meaning that an 
excited utterance made to an officer at the scene could be 
testimonial.132 
A few courts seem to suggest formality is a requirement, 
rather than an indicator, but this would appear foreclosed 
under any but the narrowest Crawford definitions.  For 
example, People v. Cage133 found a five-year-old child’s 
statement to a police officer at a hospital was not formal and 
therefore nontestimonial: 
We cannot believe that the framers would have seen a ‘striking 
resemblance’ between Deputy Mullin’s interview with John at the 
hospital and a justice of the peace’s pretrial examination.  There was 
no particular formality to the proceedings.  Deputy Mullin was still 
trying to determine whether a crime had been committed and, if so, 
by whom.  No suspect was under arrest; no trial was contemplated.  
Deputy Mullin did not summon John to a courtroom or a station 
house; he sought him out, at a neutral, public place.  There was no 
‘structured questioning,’ just an open-ended invitation for John to 
tell his story.  The interview was not recorded.  There is no evidence 
that Deputy Mullin even so much as recorded it later in a police 
report.  Police questioning is not necessarily police interrogation.  
When people refer to a ‘police interrogation,’ however colloquially, 
they have in mind something far more formal and focused.134 
This type of analysis places form over substance.  The 
absence of a police force was the prime reason that formality 
was required to obtain statements in 1791.  Thus, it is perfectly 
understandable why modern police questioning bears little 
resemblance to earlier judicial practice.  Crawford tells us that 
interrogation is referred to colloquially.  Today, one can be 
interrogated and can make accusatory statements without any 
formality at all.  Thus, while formality may suggest a 
statement is testimonial, its absence alone does not render the 
statement nontestimonial.  Similarly, the extent of questioning 
is a legitimate factor, which has led some courts to consider a 
statement made in response to minimal questioning as 
  
 132 866 A.2d 799, 811-12 (D.C. 2005), vacated by In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186 
(D.C. 2005) (en banc). 
 133 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion 
superseded, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
 134 Id. at 856-57. 
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nontestimonial.135  However, equating minimal questioning 
with an absence of formal interrogation to justify finding a 
statement is nontestimonial is inappropriate, since some 
statements that lack formality may be intended to bear witness 
against the accused by reference to the alternative definitions 
of testimonial presented in Crawford. 
C. Appellate Trends Concerning Excited Utterances to 
Police Officers 
Ironically, Crawford raises the same specter of 
unpredictability that Justice Scalia scathingly branded as the 
reason why Roberts failed to protect core Confrontation Clause 
values.  While the decisions take different approaches, People 
v. King136 recently opined that almost all cases have concluded 
that initial statements volunteered by excited declarants are 
not testimonial.  In reaching this result, courts have focused on 
the distress of the declarant, the desire to obtain assistance, as 
well as the lack of formality and the unstructured nature of the 
questioning.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Stancil rejected 
a broad view that any statements to police were testimonial, 
saying “it is unlikely that the Court intended the term to 
embrace contacts with the police that do not amount to 
interrogations.”137  However, even here complete uniformity 
does not exist.138 
Results are more mixed when the focus shifts from the 
immediately volunteered statements to all excited statements 
in field investigations, in some measure due to the variety of 
  
 135 See Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 136 People v. King, No. 02CA0201, 2005 WL 170727, at *6 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 
27, 2005) (holding that a statement is nontestimonial where made to police officer in 
“noncustodial setting and without indicia of formality”) (citing cases); see also 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 565, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that 
statements were nontestimonial where pregnant victim approached officers and said 
she was assaulted and her mother stabbed by mother’s boyfriend); Rogers v. State, 814 
N.E.2d 695, 699, 701-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding statements made to police within 
seven minutes of the incident nontestimonial); People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 
1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (per curiam) (holding Crawford 
inapplicable because police questioning of victim in obvious physical pain was not 
interrogation); Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding 
that where declarant approached officers, nervous and about to cry upon seeing her 
wrecked car, “any questions posed to her by the police were in the context of answering 
her questions and determining why she was upset”). 
 137 866 A.2d at 811. 
 138 See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
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different circumstances that are encompassed by that term.139  
The Court of Appeals in Stancil140 attempted to chart a middle 
course that treats as testimonial “a declarant’s knowing 
responses to structured questioning in an investigative 
environment or a courtroom setting where the declarant would 
reasonably expect that his or her responses might be used in 
future judicial proceedings.”141  Thus, police response to 
emergency calls, securing the scene, and preliminary 
questioning to determine what happened, produce 
nontestimonial statements under Stancil, in contrast to 
testimonial statements that result from structured questioning 
of victims or witnesses to a crime after the emergency has 
passed.142 
Other courts have adopted this distinction between 
statements made to police officers while they are “securing the 
scene” and those taken later.143  The Stancil court noted that 
“once the scene has been secured, and once the officers’ 
attention has turned to investigation and fact-gathering, 
statements made by those on the scene, in response to police 
questioning, tend in greater measure to take on a testimonial 
character[.]”144  People v. Victors145 simply asked whether the 
statement by the complainant to the officer was being used to 
  
 139 See Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *6-9 (Tex. 
Crim. App. May 19, 2005) (discussing conflicting caselaw). Compare Stancil, 866 A.2d 
799, Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 694, Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 352, 354 n.6 (Ga. 2004) 
(holding that interrogation includes the field investigation of witnesses by police 
shortly after the commission of a crime in a case where a jealous man kills the woman 
with whom he had a sexual relationship), and Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that statements made to deputies after they arrested defendant at 
scene were testimonial), with Davis v. State, No. 2-03-305-CR, 2005 WL 183141, at *3 
(Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2005) (holding statements are not testimonial where wife 
voluntarily made 911 call after discovering a body and voluntarily informed police 
officer who came to interview her of the statements that her common-law husband 
made to her. These statements were neither the product of custodial interrogation nor 
responses to “tactically structured police questioning.”); People v. Compton, No. 
B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2005) (holding that statements 
made to officer at crime scene and hospital are nontestimonial); People v. Mackey, 785 
N.Y.S.2d 870, 874 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that preliminary field investigations lack 
the requisite formality to constitute a police interrogation). 
 140 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005). 
 141 Id. at 812 (citing United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 142 Id. at 810-12. 
 143 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 555-56 (Mass. 
2005) (“questioning by law enforcement agents, whether police, prosecutors, or others 
acting directly on their behalf, other than to secure a volatile scene or to establish the 
need for or provide medical care, is interrogation in the colloquial sense.”). 
 144 Stancil, 866 A.2d at 813. 
 145 819 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
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prove an element of the offense, in finding it testimonial.146  The 
highest courts in several states are beginning to reach this 
issue.147 
Doctrinally, it appears sound to treat statements that 
would have met the narrow 1791 definition of excited 
utterances as nontestimonial when made to police officers who 
come upon the scene or are flagged down by the declarant 
while the incident is still in progress, since the combination of 
true excitement and need for assistance appears to negate any 
testimonial aspect.  Thus, I agree that the excited utterance 
was nontestimonial in Stancil v. United States,148 where the 
officers arrived to find the defendant’s daughter screaming 
with a knife in her hand pointing it at the defendant stating 
“stop hurting my mommy, stop hurting my mommy, I’m not 
going to let you hurt mommy any more.”149  She was told to 
drop the knife, complied and burst into tears.  However, 
statements made beyond those heard by the police as they 
enter the crime scene should be considered testimonial either 
by reference to the reasonable observer approach, or due to the 
investigative purpose of the officer.  It is fairly disingenuous to 
claim that the officer doesn’t know a prosecution is likely to 
occur when the jurisdiction has a pro or mandatory arrest 
policy in domestic violence cases.   
Similarly, Davis v. Texas150 rhetorically asked “[s]urely, 
a reasonable 51-year-old declarant . . . would have known that 
her accusations made to a uniformed police officer would be 
passed on to prosecutorial authorities to be used against 
appellant.”151  Thus, Davis identified such statements as 
serving “either or both of two primary objectives—to gain 
immediate official assistance in terminating an exigent 
situation and to provide information to aid investigation and 
  
 146 Id. at 320 (“[T]estimonial evidence encompasses out-of-court statements 
that are offered to establish or disprove an element of the offense charged or a matter 
of fact.”).  
 147 For example, the California Supreme Court has granted review in People 
v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion 
superseded, 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005), and in People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. 
App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004), to address 
issues concerning police questioning.  See also State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 
2005). 
 148 866 A.2d 799. 
 149 Id. at 802. 
 150 No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964 (Tex. Crim. App. May 19, 2005). 
 151 Id. at *10.  
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possible prosecution arising from the situation.”152  Davis 
recognized the difficulty of drawing a definitive line between 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay in this context, but 
punted, finding harmless error in light of the defendant’s trial 
testimony confirming most of the incident.153  
While State v. Wright154 agreed that a reasonable citizen 
interacting with a police officer would likely know any 
statement made might be used at trial, the Wright court 
rejected this view of testimonial statements as contrary to 
Crawford’s intended result and analysis.  Instead, Wright 
listed eight factors as helpful to analyze field examinations: (1) 
whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the 
declarant’s purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain 
assistance); (3) whether the police or the declarant initiated the 
conversation; (4) the location where the statements were made 
(e.g., the declarant’s home, a squad car, or the police station); 
(5) the declarant’s emotional state when the statements were 
made; (6) the level of formality and structure of the 
conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the officers’ 
purpose in speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the 
scene, to determine what happened, or to collect evidence); and 
(8) if and how the statements were recorded.155  Ironically, this 
analysis supported the Wright court’s  finding that a field 
statement was not testimonial, even though the defendant was 
in custody at the time it was made, and the officers took notes 
and evidence while interviewing the victim.  This seems 
reminiscent of approaches to Roberts, positing factors that 
could be used by different courts to reach opposite results. 
State v. Mason156 proposed a simpler test, acknowledging 
the importance of deciding whether the statement was made as 
part of the incident or part of the prosecution by requiring trial 
courts to ascertain (1) whether the declarant initiated the 
statement; (2) the formality of the setting; and (3) the 
declarant’s purpose in making the statement.157  Other courts 
  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. at *10-11. 
 154 701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005). 
 155 Id. at 812-13. 
 156 110 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 157 Id. at 249. 
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appear to adopt a totality approach without necessarily 
defining fixed factors to be analyzed in every case.158 
Any confrontation approach that requires discerning the 
intent of the declarant is likely to prove difficult to administer 
or result in the categorical exclusion of excited utterances.  For 
example, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Fowler concluded 
that the classification of a statement as an excited utterance 
supports the conclusion that the statement is nontestimonial in 
nature because it was made under the stress of the event, not 
with intent or knowledge that the statement might later be 
used at trial.159  The Mason160 court viewed the witness’ purpose 
in initiating police contact and making the statement as the 
central issue, holding that “statements made while in peril for 
the purpose of seeking protection, rather than for the purpose 
of bearing witness, are not testimonial.”161  However, given that 
in many states excited utterances are interpreted expansively, 
as Stancil indicates, mere excitement does not predict the 
declarant’s state of mind. 
Moreover, since the declarant will always be absent at 
trial, it will be difficult to assess her subjective intent, unless 
we have other witnesses or her own statements at a later time.  
The court in Gray cites Lopez as indicating that whether a 
statement falls within an objective observer category depends 
on the purpose for which it is made, not on the emotional state 
of the declarant.162  Some courts appear to conflate a subjective 
and objective approach.  The court in State v. Hembertt163 
indicated that a declarant who responds to police questioning, 
“structured and conducted for the purpose of producing 
evidence in anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution, 
should reasonably anticipate his or her testimony being used 
against the accused.”164  Similarly, while the Indiana Supreme 
Court viewed the motivation of the questioner as more 
important than that of the declarant, it noted that “if either is 
principally motivated by a desire to preserve the statement it is 
  
 158 See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 454-56 (Ind. 2005) (discussing 
different approaches employed to distinguish testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay). 
 159 Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by 829 
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005)). 
 160 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  
 161 Mason, 110 P.3d at 249. 
 162 Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). 
 163 696 N.W.2d 473, 485 (Neb. 2005). 
 164 Id. at 482 (emphasis added). 
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sufficient to render the statement “testimonial.”165  Thus, the 
subjective motivation of the person taking the statement or the 
objectively evaluated purpose of the goals of the procedure 
being followed by that individual is sufficient.166  If subjective 
intent is viewed from the perspective of an objective declarant 
in her circumstances, the context is still important to avoid 
finding such statements are nontestimonial, when in fact some 
of them may bear witness against the accused.  Professor 
Méndez has identified a number of obstacles to predicting 
declarant’s mental state under either a subjective or objective 
approach.167 
D. Excited Utterances Made in 911 Calls Should Be Viewed 
Skeptically 
Numerous cases have held that 911 calls are 
nontestimonial because they are victim initiated, and the 
intention of the citizen is to be rescued.168  The call is viewed as 
part of the incident in progress, providing the declarant with 
no time for contemplation.  People v. Moscat,169 probably the 
most influential 911 case, characterized such calls as “the 
electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for help.  The 
Confrontation Clause was not directed at such a cry.”  Fowler v. 
State,170 another early post-Crawford case, noted that Crawford 
is limited to police “interrogation,” not all police questioning.171  
The Fowler court concluded that the victim’s 911 statement 
was nontestimonial because it was not given in a formal 
setting, was not given during any type of pretrial hearing or 
deposition, was not contained within a formalized document, 
and questioning at the scene did not qualify as a classic police 
  
 165 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456 (Ind. 2005). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
569 (2004); see also Major Robert Wm. Best, To Be or Not To Be Testimonial? That Is 
the Question, 2005 APR ARMY LAW. 65, 78-79 (arguing focus on subjective expectation 
of a 911 caller is incorrect in determining whether statement is testimonial). 
 168 See State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 768-72 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing 
several cases involving the testimonial nature of 911 calls); see also King-Ries, supra 
note 91 (arguing for broad admission of 911 calls and preliminary statements to the 
police). 
 169 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 170 809 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 
2005) (holding that a victim’s statement was nontestimonial because it lacked “official 
and formal quality of such a statement”). 
 171 Id. at 963. 
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interrogation.172  In Pitts v. State,173 the 911 statements were 
viewed as not made for the purpose of establishing or proving a 
fact regarding some past event, but for the purpose of 
preventing or stopping a crime as it was actually occurring.  
The caller there requested that police come to her home to 
remove Pitts, who she said had broken into her house.174  
Similarly, State v. Wright175 held that statements made during 
a 911 call were not testimonial because the caller wanted 
protection from an immediate danger.   
In contrast, People v. Cortes176 concluded that 911 calls 
are testimonial, based on a number of factors: the police 
prepare the public to use 911 to report crimes; information is 
given on what to report, operators use protocols for obtaining 
information, and calls are recorded and preserved.  Therefore, 
regardless of what the caller believes, the purpose of the 
information is for investigation, prosecution and potential use 
at a judicial proceeding.177  The technology even permits the 
operator to see the caller’s telephone number if a land line is 
used.  In Cortes, Judge Bamberger conducted a thorough 
historical review to bolster her conclusions.  Surprisingly, this 
opinion has not received the same degree of attention as 
Moscat.  Many 911 decisions do not mention or try to 
distinguish Cortes, possibly viewing it based on a unique 911 
system or New York state constitutional law.  However, the 
federal constitutional analysis has general application, and 
most of the significant features of 911 systems nationwide are 
substantially similar.178  While Cortes concerned a witness to a 
crime, rather than a victim, which makes it more likely the 
statement is testimonial, this fact should not result in all 911 
calls by victims being nontestimonial.179 
  
 172 The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that 
because the declarant’s refusal to continue testifying was not challenged by the 
defendant, he forfeited his right to confront her. 829 N.E.2d at 471. 
 173 612 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 174 Id. at 2. 
 175 686 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 
(Minn. 2005). 
 176 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 177 Id. at 415. 
 178 See, e.g., materials at National Emergency Number Association website, at 
http://www.nena9-1-1.org/PR_Pubs/Devel_of_911.htm (last visited Sep. 6, 2005). 
 179 See also State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a call 
testimonial where its purpose was to report a crime, but was not a call for help); see 
generally Richard Friedman, Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1242-43 (2002) (distinguishing between two primary objectives in making a 
911 call—gaining immediate official assistance and providing information to aid 
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Ultimately, the prosecutorial aspects of 911 calls are 
such that only the initial cry for help should be considered 
nontestimonial.  Identification of the perpetrator and any 
response to questions beyond what happened should be 
considered testimonial.  People v. West180 provides a framework 
for analyzing 911 calls, which recognizes that 911 calls must be 
parsed, and that some statements may be testimonial while 
others are not.  West held a rape victim’s “statements made to 
the 911 dispatcher concerning the nature of the alleged 
attack, . . . medical needs, and her age and location are not 
testimonial in nature, and were properly admitted at trial.”181  
These statements, given immediately after her brutal assault 
and while she was in shock, were to request medical and police 
assistance, to gather information about the situation and to 
secure medical attention for her, “not to produce evidence in 
anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution.”182  In contrast, 
West held that statements describing her vehicle, the direction 
in which her assailants fled, and the items of personal property 
they took were testimonial in nature.183  The difference turned 
on the fact that the statements were made in response to 
questions posed by the dispatcher for the stated purpose of 
involving the police, which implicated the central concerns 
underlying the Confrontation Clause. 
While not all courts distinguish excited utterances made 
in person to police officers from those made in 911 calls, as 
Cortes suggests, there are reasons that support interpreting 
911 calls narrowly in considering whether they are testimonial.  
This includes: 
1. The technology is widely publicized as a way 
to communicate with police to obtain assistance; 
2. All calls are recorded and preserved; 
3. The land line phone number and location of 
the call is revealed to the operator; and 
  
investigation—and suggesting that this difference be a controlling factor in 
determining the admissibility of the statements). 
 180 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 181 Id. at 91. 
 182 Id. at 92. 
 183 Id. 
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4. Most 911 protocols dictate questions that go 
beyond ascertaining an emergency and 
determining location to serve investigative 
purpose. 
Similarly, in People v. Dobbin,184 the court found 911 
statements to be testimonial because the caller who had 
witnessed a robbery was officially reporting a crime to the 
government agency, could objectively expect to be called as a 
witness, and was asked a series of over fifteen questions by 
“Police Operator 1521.”185  While the fact that the caller is a 
bystander, rather than the victim, makes an even stronger case 
for finding statements testimonial, 911 calls by victims should 
be considered testimonial as to their accusatory aspects.  
Generally, it is a crime to interfere with a 911 call.186  Even 
though this criminalization emphasizes the role the 
government plays in creating and preserving this type of 
hearsay and the fact that an objective observer would expect 
the call to be used prosecutorially, the case that mentioned this 
fact did not recognize its potential impact on the testimonial 
analysis.  Indeed, the call in question was considered 
nontestimonial.187 
Arguably, the very nature of 911 raises the “core” 
Confrontation Clause concern of preventing anonymous 
accusers in Star Chamber proceedings.  For example, the Court 
of Appeals’ decision in State v. Wright188 argued that “there is a 
cloak of anonymity surrounding 911 calls that encourages 
citizens to make emergency calls and not fear repercussion.”189  
While this fact was used to favor its holding that the call was 
nontestimonial, this rationale appears to support the opposite 
conclusion. 
My view is that the prosecutorial aspects of 911 calls are 
such that only the initial cry for help should be considered 
nontestimonial.  In other words, because 911 calls have a dual 
purpose—obtaining help and initiating a criminal investigation 
of the crime—the calls must be parsed depending on their 
function.  Therefore, the identity of the perpetrator or any 
  
 184 791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 185 Id. at 901-02. 
 186 See Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (multiple hang-ups in 
rapid succession were enough to establish crime).  
 187 Id. 
 188 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005). 
 189 Id. at 302. 
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information obtained as a result of questioning by the 911 
operator would be viewed as testimonial, while information 
about the nature of the injury would not.  This type of approach 
has been used in other hearsay contexts, most analogously in 
declarations against penal interest.  For example, in 
Williamson v. United States,190 the Court required each 
statement in a narrative to be viewed separately to determine 
whether it was disserving or self-serving.  Indeed, in State v. 
Davis,191 the Washington Supreme Court recently cited 
Williamson in recognizing that 911 calls may contain both 
nontestimonial and testimonial statements.192  However, Davis 
considered the immediate identification of the assailant as 
nontestimonial, where this type of information appears 
unnecessary to the basic goal of providing assistance. 
In summary, doctrinally, a narrow reading of res gestae 
volunteered to police officers arriving to secure the scene 
supports the admission of such statements as nontestimonial 
on an outcry theory.  I have more difficulty about how to treat 
911 calls, due to their mixed purposes.  Not only do they act as 
Moscat’s electronically augmented equivalent of a “loud cry for 
help,” but the government also uses the 911 system as an 
investigative tool and promotes its ability to provide anonymity 
to accusers.  This dual use warrants an approach that 
considers as nontestimonial only the introductory plea for help 
that explains the nature of the emergency.  Therefore, the 
identity of the perpetrator or any information obtained as a 
result of questioning by the 911 operator should be viewed as 
testimonial.  It should also be remembered that even in the 
absence of the complainant, the admission of testimonial 
excited utterances identifying a batterer can be harmless error, 
because they either repeat information in excited utterances 
made to private individuals or admissions of the defendant, or 
there is other admissible evidence.  So far, courts have not been 
willing to extend any of the testimonial definitions to private 
individuals outside of the child abuse context.193 
  
 190 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). 
 191 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
 192 Id. at 851. 
 193 See, e.g., People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. 
granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 WL 2376474 (Colo. Oct 25, 2004) (extensive statements 
made by domestic violence victim to a friend admitted as excited utterances were not 
testimonial). 
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V. OTHER HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS FREQUENTLY USED IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
A. Statements for Medical Diagnosis and Treatment194 
Statements for medical diagnosis and treatment are 
also staples in child abuse and domestic violence cases.  While 
a number of jurisdictions have permitted the identity of the 
perpetrator to be admitted under Rule 803(4) in child abuse 
cases, several courts have also extended the medical exception 
in this fashion on the theory that in domestic violence 
situations, the physician’s knowledge that the assailant was a 
family or household member affects the treatment protocol, 
including discharge to an appropriate environment.195 
United States v. Joe,196 which admitted statements to a 
physician identifying the victim’s estranged husband as having 
raped her, explained why this use of Rule 803(4) was 
appropriate.  According to Joe, 
All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and 
psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend 
on the identity of the abuser.  The physician generally must know 
who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the 
physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a 
member of the victim’s family or household.  In the domestic sexual 
abuse case, for example, the treating physician may recommend 
special therapy or counseling and instruct the victim to remove 
herself from the dangerous environment by leaving the home and 
seeking shelter elsewhere.  In short, the domestic sexual abuser’s 
identity is admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser has such 
an intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser’s identity 
becomes ‘reasonably pertinent’ to the victim’s proper treatment.197 
Post-Crawford, the key issue will be whether identifying 
the perpetrator is testimonial.  At least one court has taken 
this view in relation to a woman raped in a case where 
domestic violence was not implicated.  In People v. West,198 
statements made to doctors regarding the nature of the alleged 
  
 194 For additional discussion regarding medical diagnosis and treatment 
statements in child abuse cases, see Part VI. 
 195 See, e.g., State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Nash v. 
State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  But see People v. Swinger, 689 
N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (Crim. Ct. 1998) (admitting domestic violence victim’s statements 
identifying who assaulted her under business records exception). 
 196 8 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 197 Id. at 1494-95. 
 198 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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attack, and the cause of her symptoms and pain were viewed as 
nontestimonial, but statements of fault or identity were 
rejected as testimonial, because they implicate the core 
concerns protected by the Confrontation Clause.199 
In contrast, other cases view all statements within Rule 
803(4) as nontestimonial.  Indeed, the complainant’s use of a 
specialized healthcare facility designed to provide expert care 
to victims of violent sexual assault, where she gave a statement 
identifying the perpetrator, did not render the nurse’s 
testimony as testimonial in State v. Stahl.200  More typically, 
some courts appear to treat any statements in medical records 
as nontestimonial, whether relying on Rule 803(6), 803(4), or a 
combination thereof.  In People v. Rogers,201 hospital records 
containing a rape victim’s statements were assumed to be 
admissible as business records.  Similarly, a sexual assault 
information sheet that had a dual purpose of investigation and 
treatment of the victim’s potential physical and psychological 
injuries did not violate Crawford since “the history was 
germane to treatment, [so] it falls within the traditional 
business records exception.”202 
Simply relying on Crawford’s reference to business 
records as covering statements “that by their nature were not 
testimonial”203  appears misguided.  Unlike 1791, business 
records now include opinions and diagnoses, as well as double 
hearsay of declarants who have no business duty to report 
when the additional layer of hearsay fits within some other 
exception.  A more reasoned approach would be to treat dual 
purpose documents as testimonial where their investigative 
aspects are significant.   
Recognizing that business records prepared for 
litigation should be analyzed differently, Rogers did hold that a 
report giving results of testing on victim’s blood was improperly 
admitted as a business record, in a prosecution for first-degree 
rape and first-degree sodomy.204  The court considered the 
report to be testimonial even though it was generated by a 
private laboratory that conducted the tests, because it was 
requested by and prepared for law enforcement for the purpose 
  
 199 Id. at 89-90. 
 200 No. 22261, 2005 WL 602687, slip op. at *7 (Ohio App. Mar. 16, 2005). 
 201 780 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 2004). 
 202 Id.  
 203 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
 204 Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 396. 
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of prosecution, and it was the basis for expert testimony as to 
the victim’s intoxication level, which was directly related to her 
ability to consent.205  Similarly, in Smith v. State,206 admission 
of autopsy evidence and an autopsy report without testimony 
by the medical examiner who performed the autopsy violated 
the Confrontation Clause where the manner of death was an 
element of the crime and the defendant claimed the killing was 
in self-defense.  In contrast, several cases have held a certified 
copy of an autopsy report is nontestimonial.207  It is difficult to 
understand how an autopsy report would not fit within the 
declarant/objective witness definitions, if not within the 
functional equivalent of an ex parte affidavit test. 
To the extent that the doctor has a reporting duty in 
domestic violence cases, the argument can be made that the 
statements are testimonial, either because the doctor is an 
agent of the police or because an objective witness would view 
the statements as available for prosecution.  In addition, 
VAWA has sponsored research on improving medical records in 
domestic violence cases.208  If a doctor adopts the protocols 
suggested to aid healthcare providers to “help victims” by 
selecting what to record and implicitly what to ask, and how to 
record the statements, it is also arguable that the resulting 
recording of the victim’s statements becomes testimonial.209 
B. Dying Declarations 
While only a small percentage of domestic violence cases 
result in a female being killed, a third of all female single 
victim killings are carried out by their male intimates, as well 
as nearly two-thirds of nonstranger killings of females.210  
Ironically, dying declarations may be less of a factor in 
  
 205 Id. at 396-97. 
 206 898 So. 2d 907, 917 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). 
 207 See, e.g., Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. App. 2005) 
(alternatively finding harmless error); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867-68 (Sup. 
Ct. 2005). 
 208 See, e.g., NANCY E. ISAAC & V. PUALANI ENOS, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
DOCUMENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  HOW HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS CAN HELP 
VICTIMS (NCJ 188564) (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/188564.pdf. 
 209 Id. 
 210 VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 
2002 HOMICIDE DATA 3 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/ 
wmmw2004.pdf; see also RENNISON, supra note 65, at 2. 
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domestic violence cases because the deaths often occur at home 
with no witnesses. 
Crawford appears to give an automatic pass to dying 
declarations as being sui generis without determining whether 
the rationale is one of forfeiture, necessity, or some type of 
moralistic imperative.211  This view has been almost universally 
adopted by the courts that have reached the question.212  For 
example, in People v. Monterroso,213 the California Supreme 
Court held that dying declarations do not violate confrontation, 
noting that “[d]ying declarations were admissible at common 
law in felony cases, even when the defendant was not present 
at the time the statement was taken.”  Monterroso cites State v. 
Houser 214 stating:  
to exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation 
‘would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and 
here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional 
provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and 
regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion 
in some cases would inevitably set at naught [sic].’215 
Only one case has denied admission to a testimonial dying 
declaration, claiming “there is no rationale in Crawford or 
otherwise under which dying declarations should be treated 
differently than any other testimonial statement.”216  
Regardless of the lack of historical or other justification, I 
would be amazed if the Court rejected testimonial dying 
declarations, not only because of the necessity underlying the 
exception, but because most of these statements appear to fit 
the forfeiture approach courts have adopted concerning 
murdered declarants. 
C. Prior Inconsistent Statements 
If the victim testifies, jurisdictions vary as to what type 
of prior inconsistent statements can be admitted substantively.  
This issue is significant because so many of the women who 
testify in domestic violence cases recant.  While approximately 
  
 211 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
 212 See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2005). 
 213 101 P.3d 956, 971-72 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3203 (2005). 
 214 26 Mo. 431 (1858). 
 215 Monterroso, 101 P.3d at 972 (citing Houser, 26 Mo. at 438). 
 216 United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *3 
(D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2005).  
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seventeen states permit any inconsistent statements 
substantively, the remainder tend to follow the federal model 
which requires a sworn statement in a proceeding.217  Professor 
Lininger has suggested amending the rule to include sworn 
affidavits as is required in Oregon.218  For example, in State v. 
Thach,219 the court noted that the sworn affidavit admitted in a 
domestic violence case was properly admitted substantively 
and since the victim testified, the Confrontation Clause was 
not implicated.  I agree that such an amendment is desirable in 
jurisdictions that do not freely admit prior inconsistent 
statements.  However, I have never understood the benefit of 
the oath and proceeding requirements in Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 
given the vast amount of other hearsay made admissible by the 
Rules.  Indeed, the fact that inconsistent statements may be 
permitted for impeachment, but not substantively, has caused 
mischief in other contexts when the claim is made that the 
impeachment evidence is being introduced solely to apprise the 
jury of otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
When the inconsistent statement is the only proof of an 
essential element, sufficiency questions may arise in some 
jurisdictions.  In California, the substantial evidence test 
adopted by People v. Cuevas220 rejected the earlier rule 
requiring corroboration of out-of-court identifications and held 
that the sufficiency of an out-of-court identification to support a 
conviction is to be determined under the substantial evidence 
test. 
The admission of prior inconsistent statements typically 
does not pose a confrontation problem because the declarant is 
present at trial, resulting in United States v. Owens221 rather 
than Crawford governing the analysis.  While Crawford did not 
specifically reference Owens, it cited California v. Green222 for 
the proposition that “when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no 
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements.”223  Green specifically held that admission of a prior 
  
 217 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 26.5-26.7 (7th ed. 2000 
& Supp. 2004). 
 218 Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 803-05.  
 219 No. 30757-0-II, 2005 WL 103136, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2005). 
 220 906 P.2d 1290, 1304 (Cal. 1995). 
 221 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988). 
 222 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 223 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004) (citing Green, 399 
U.S. at 162). 
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inconsistent statement did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause when the declarant was given an opportunity to explain 
or deny it.224  The only potential wrinkle is when the witness is 
essentially mute at trial, which is typically not the case with a 
domestic violence complainant, who is either evasive, denies 
making the statement, or claims she lied because she was 
jealous or otherwise annoyed with the alleged battered.  
Recently, Fowler v. State held that a complainant in a domestic 
violence case who took the stand, but refused to answer 
questions with no claim of privilege, was available for cross-
examination under Crawford if no effort was made to have her 
held in contempt or otherwise compelled to respond.225  While 
her statements were admitted as excited utterances, this mode 
of analysis would also appear to apply to prior inconsistent 
statements. 
D. Ad Hoc Hearsay Exceptions 
California and Oregon have ad hoc hearsay exceptions 
directed towards domestic violence victims.  For example, 
California has an exception for statements that narrate, 
describe or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury 
upon the declarant, which were made at or near the time of the 
incident.226  The California exception is limited to cases in 
which the declarant is unavailable.  Oregon’s statute permits 
statements made up to twenty-four hours later.227  Both require 
that the statement be made to specific categories of individuals 
such as law enforcement or other governmental or medical 
personnel, unless in writing.228  To the extent that a statute has 
no application, other than to create a testimonial statement, it 
will not survive a constitutional challenge.  However, Oregon’s 
exception also applies to statements made by testifying 
declarants,229 and both apply to written or trustworthy 
statements that are arguably nontestimonial.230  Thus, even if 
  
 224 Green, 399 U.S. at 162. 
 225 829 N.E.2d 459, 465-67 (Ind. 2005). 
 226 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(1) & (3) (West 2001).  While broader than 
domestic violence, the section was enacted as a reaction to the O.J. Simpson case, and 
has been applied primarily in the domestic violence context.  
 227 OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26)(a) (2002). 
 228 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(5); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26)(a)(A). 
 229 See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460. 
 230 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (a)(4) & (5); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(5), (18), 
(28). 
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unconstitutional in a particular application, the statute itself is 
not unconstitutional.231  In addition, if a state has enacted a 
Rule 807 catch-all, which permits the admission of trustworthy 
hearsay in the court’s discretion, the exception would also 
apply in a number of domestic violence settings, and has been 
used to admit diaries.232  Post-Crawford reversals have occurred 
in cases admitting statements pursuant to California’s 
domestic violence exception.233 
Determining what is testimonial when the statement is 
not made in a law enforcement context will be problematic 
until the Court articulates its definition of what other types of 
statements are accusatory.  Whether from the perspective of a 
declarant or an objective observer, factual distinctions will still 
be important.  For example, many women’s advocates tell 
domestic violence victims to keep a diary so that if anything 
happens, their voices will be heard.  Even in a reliability 
framework, some of these diaries were questioned as being self-
serving.234  If child custody or alimony was a consideration, 
such knowledge would appear to make the diary testimonial, 
admissible only if a forfeiture rationale applies.  Other women 
may keep a diary without any expectation of its potential use in 
a prosecution.235 
After Crawford, ad hoc hearsay exceptions for recorded 
victim statements to police still provide the necessary evidence 
to convict when the complainant testifies, even if she recants, 
since Crawford clearly leaves Owens236 intact.  For the 
confrontation analysis, it does not matter that the victim 
recants as trial, or what exception the hearsay is admitted 
under, so long as she testifies and is subject to cross-
  
 231 See, e.g., People v. Compton, No. B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 26, 2005) (section 1370 is not unconstitutional since it is not invalid under 
every construction post-Crawford). 
 232 See, e.g., United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1991) (pre-
Crawford case which upheld admission of a diary under the residual hearsay exception, 
even though the declarant’s attorney had advised the declarant to begin keeping the 
diary in anticipation of litigation, because the diary contained circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness). 
 233 See, e.g., People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 2004); 
People v. Zarazua, No. H025472, 2004 WL 837914, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004). 
 234 See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 423 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(rejecting diary in light of the hotly contested divorce proceeding, which gave the 
decedent a reason to fabricate or misrepresent her thoughts). 
 235 See, e.g., Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (diary 
admitted pursuant to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 was not testimonial and satisfied Wright 
test).  
 236 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
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examination, since the jury is able “to assess her demeanor as 
she attempted to deny or explain away the prior statements.”237 
Pre-Crawford, my suggestion that a new hearsay 
exception be adopted concerning domestic violence was 
cautiously limited to domestic violence murder cases.238  After 
Crawford, though, I am inclined to argue for a broader 
domestic violence exception based on trustworthiness.  The 
Supreme Court does not appear to have backed away from its 
stance encouraging states to expand hearsay exceptions.  
Therefore, jurisdictions should be urged to adopt a broad 
domestic violence hearsay exception permitting trustworthy 
statements concerning any incident of domestic violence or fear 
induced by the actions of the defendant.  Such an exception 
should not contain availability limitations to avoid being 
unconstitutional in all applications.239  If any timing restriction 
is added, admission should be confined to statements made 
within the past five years.  As with the catch-all exception, 
notice of the intent to introduce evidence pursuant to this 
exception should be required.  The benefit of such an approach 
is that the complainant’s statements would be admissible if the 
witness is available at trial, without regard to limitations that 
might otherwise be imposed on prior inconsistent statements.  
More significantly, if the declarant is unavailable at trial and 
the statement is deemed testimonial, it may still be admitted in 
a specific case if the forfeiture doctrine applies. 
VI. EXCEPTIONS TO THE TESTIMONIAL BAN IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES 
A. Prior Opportunity to Cross-Examine Unavailable (Adult) 
Declarants 
Crawford permits testimonial statements of unavailable 
declarants, if the defendant had a “prior opportunity for cross-
examination.”240  The traditional ways of satisfying this 
standard are through testimony at a prior trial or preliminary 
hearing in the same case.  While I agree with Professor 
Mosteller that we should attempt to create more opportunities 
  
 237 People v. Martinez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508, 519 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 238 Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1512-17. 
 239 Cf. People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Ct. App. 2004) (elder abuse 
statute unconstitutional, where it admitted only testimonial statements). 
 240 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). 
356 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
for pretrial cross-examination,241  I am not as confident as he is 
of the practicalities of such an approach.  Even in Florida, 
where defendants can take either a discovery or a preservation 
of testimony deposition, conflict has arisen about whether the 
discovery deposition satisfies confrontation in the absence of 
the declarant at trial.  Lopez v. State, a domestic violence 
prosecution, held that a discovery deposition does not satisfy 
the Confrontation Clause because the defendant is not entitled 
to use the deposition substantively and is not on notice that the 
deposition will perpetuate testimony, so the focus is different 
from cross-examination at trial.242  In contrast, in Blanton v. 
State,243 a child abuse case in which the defendant did not 
introduce the discovery deposition at trial, and could have 
requested a deposition to perpetuate testimony, the admission 
of testimonial hearsay was not found to be a Confrontation 
Clause violation. 
There has been some discussion about a statutory 
amendment in Florida to satisfy Crawford.244  While Blanton 
might also be read to shift the burden to the defendant to call 
the declarant, most courts appear to be rejecting this 
approach.245  Roberts mandates that a preliminary hearing 
must present an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.  
The major failing in Florida appears to be that the discovery 
deposition cannot be used substantively at trial.  This could be 
remedied by an amendment permitting substantive use by the 
defendant when the declarant is unavailable and the 
declarant’s statement is introduced at trial.246 
Limited cross-examination in preliminary hearings also 
impacts the ability to survive a Confrontation Clause challenge 
for testimonial hearsay.  Blanton asks, but does not decide if 
the opportunity for cross-examination has to be meaningful.  
But, what is its purpose if it is simply a ritual? For example, 
the court in People v. Fry247 held that preliminary hearing 
testimony violated Crawford when introduced at trial because 
  
 241 See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 609-10.  
 242 888 So. 2d 693, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 243 880 So. 2d 798, 799-801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 244 See John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New 
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. B. J. 26, 31 (Oct. 2004). 
 245 See, e.g., State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Bratton v. 
State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 246 See Yetter supra note 244, at 31 (suggesting stipulation or advance waiver 
permitting substantive use at trial). 
 247 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). 
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such hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate 
opportunity for cross-examination.248  In contrast, other 
jurisdictions have viewed cross-examination at a probable 
cause hearing as sufficient.249  To the extent that preliminary 
hearings do not provide for adequate cross-examination in 
felony cases, jurisdictions should consider amending their 
procedures to survive a Crawford challenge.  To limit the 
impact of such revisions on state practice, expanded hearings 
could apply only to those categories of cases most likely to 
result in witnesses not appearing for trial, such as domestic 
violence and child abuse cases, as well as to the most serious 
felonies. 
Judges Karan and Gersten have suggested establishing 
a fast track procedure for cross-examination of domestic 
violence statements.250  If I were defense counsel, it is unclear 
that post-Crawford I would ask for a deposition unless I was 
sure that the declarant intended to testify.  However, the 
prosecutor might, in domestic violence cases, routinely set an 
early perpetuation deposition.  In most jurisdictions, 
depositions in domestic violence cases would require a 
statutory amendment.  It is unclear how many states would 
enact such a procedure, particularly when in misdemeanor 
cases the declarant would not otherwise be required to appear 
before trial.  Moreover, it is often difficult for a woman to 
appear, given childcare or job responsibilities, as well as 
ambivalence as to whether to proceed at all.  A fast track trial 
setting of 30 to 45 days in misdemeanor cases might prove a 
better route to providing witness attendance, especially if a 
support team ensured that the witnesses would be available, or 
if not, providing for rescheduling before the trial date and 
without the need for the witness to appear and be told to come 
again. 
Attempts to set trials even sooner would likely meet 
constitutional objections under a due process rationale by 
defense counsel who could claim that they had insufficient time 
  
 248 Id. at 981; see also State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259, 266-67 (Wis. 2005) 
(limited cross-examination at preliminary hearing rendered prior testimony 
inadmissible at trial). 
 249 See, e.g., State v. Crocker, 852 A.2d 762, 787 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); People 
v. Hernandez, No. 253227, 2005 WL 562807, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2005); see 
also State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259, 265-67 (Wis. 2005) (limited cross-examination at 
preliminary hearing rendered prior testimony inadmissible at trial). 
 250 Judge Amy Karan & Judge David M. Gersten, Domestic Violence: Hearsay 
Exceptions in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, 13 NCJFCJ 20, 23 (2004). 
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to investigate the case and present a defense.251  Ironically, the 
prosecution might also be disadvantaged by immediate trials, 
since in a world of scarce resources, investigation and 
preparation of domestic violence misdemeanors may require 
more time in order to obtain evidence to meet the government’s 
burden of proof.  For example, medical records and personnel 
as well as the complainant and police officer would need to be 
available. 
Even when full cross-examination has occurred, this has 
not ensured admission in the absence of the declarant.  In State 
v. Hale,252 the court found a Confrontation Clause violation 
when evidence was admitted as prior testimony, but was cross-
examined by a codefendant at a separate trial.  In other words, 
this very defendant must cross-examine the declarant.  While 
this result appears harsh, it accords with the limitation that 
prior testimony is limited to cases in which the defendant has 
previously cross-examined the witness.  Recently, using the 
catch-all exception, cases have expanded the introduction of 
prior testimony beyond its historic confines.  As a matter of 
constitutional dimension, if states can expand their hearsay 
exceptions, it appears highly ritualistic to argue that the 
testimony should be lost because a person with the same 
motive and opportunity as the defendant was the cross-
examiner.  However, Crawford clearly disapproved of cases in 
which the declarant’s prior testimony was examined by other 
counsel.253 
B. Waiver of Confrontation and Harmless Error 
Post-Crawford, defendants can still waive the right to 
confrontation by not raising the issue at trial, by opening the 
door, or as a result of trial strategy.  For example, when the 
defendant in State v. Lasnetski called his wife to testify at trial, 
he waived his right to challenge her testimonial hearsay, even 
though he claimed his decision was not voluntary because it 
was a result of the court’s erroneous pretrial ruling.254  In 
domestic violence cases, opening the door is often significant to 
  
 251 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974); Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).  
 252 691 N.W.2d 637, 647 (Wis. 2005). 
 253 541 U.S. 36, 64-65 (2004) (citing State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918-20 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) and State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 254 State v. Lasnetski, 696 N.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (trial 
strategy acted as waiver). 
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introducing a dead victim’s statements that demonstrate her 
state of mind.  In other words, such statements are typically 
inadmissible because her state of mind is not relevant to any 
issue at trial.255  However, when the defense claims that the 
decedent committed suicide, or her death was accidental or a 
result of self-defense, it opens the door to the declarant’s state 
of mind.256 
While opening the door is uncontroversial regarding 
nontestimonial hearsay, some may question whether its use is 
foreclosed concerning testimonial hearsay in the absence of any 
misconduct by the defendant, since opening the door is an 
evidentiary rule, rather than constitutional in nature.  United 
States v. Cromer257 cites Crawford for the proposition that the 
Confrontation Clause is not dependent upon the law of 
Evidence.258  Therefore, “the mere fact that Cromer may have 
opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-court statement that 
violated his confrontation right is not sufficient to erase that 
violation.”259  I disagree with the proposition that trial strategy 
cannot waive rights of constitutional dimension.  For example, 
Michigan v. Lucas260 held that excluding evidence of 
defendant’s past sexual conduct with the victim for failure to 
comply with rape shield’s notice and hearing is not a per se 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.  If trial strategy could result 
in the loss of a constitutional right pre-Crawford, there is no 
reason to require a different result post-Crawford. 
A few post-Crawford decisions have recognized the 
continuing viability of this doctrine.  For example, in People v. 
McMillian,261 the defense counsel’s questioning of an officer in a 
robbery trial led to the disclosure of an out of court testimonial 
  
 255 See Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1506-17; see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Levanduski, No. 937 EDA 2004, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 497, at *14-
23 (Mar. 31, 2005) (Five-page torn-up letter found in trash was not testimonial, but 
was inadmissible because it fit no hearsay exception.  State of mind exception rejected 
because content was being introduced for its truth that the decedent who was shot with 
his own gun, feared his common-law wife and her lover, and predicted that if he was 
found dead, it would not be suicide.). 
 256 See, e.g., People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL 941454, at *5 
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (evidence of domestic violence relevant to rebut defense 
theory that shooting occurred in heat of passion in response to nagging, rather than as 
the culmination of a pattern of abuse). 
 257 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 258 Id. at 679 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61). 
 259 Id. 
 260 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991). 
 261 No. 244711, 2004 WL 979701, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. May 6, 2004). 
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statement.  Similarly, in Le v. State,262 the Court held that by 
calling witnesses to testify about the decedent’s statements, the 
defendant opened the door for the State to call a rebuttal 
witness to contradict the defense witnesses’ testimony. 
People v. Ko263 raised this issue in a case where the 
defense to murdering a former girlfriend was for the defendant 
to blame his current girlfriend.  In its direct case, the 
prosecution offered “testimony by a detective recounting 
statements made by the girlfriend that a bloody shirt found at 
the murder scene belonged to her, but was often worn by 
defendant, and that the bloody pants found there belonged to 
defendant.”264  The court found that the defendant opened the 
door to the admission of the entire statement concerning the 
clothing found at the murder scene by raising the issue of the 
clothing in his opening statement and in seeking leave in his 
opposition to the People’s in limine motion, to introduce the 
girlfriend’s statement that the shirt found belonged to her.  
Once the defendant insisted upon introducing the portion of the 
statement regarding the girlfriend’s ownership of the shirt, the 
entire statement became admissible to avoid 
misrepresentation.  The court reasoned that “[a] contrary 
holding would allow a defendant to mislead the jury by 
selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial 
statement that are potentially helpful to the defense, while 
concealing from the jury other details that would tend to 
explain the portions introduced and place them in context.”265  
Ko viewed the doctrine of opening the door as having an 
equitable basis, even if the behavior cannot be described as 
misconduct.  However, not all defense strategies will rise to the 
level that will permit rebuttal by testimonial statements.266 
Given that Crawford completely changed the 
Confrontation Clause landscape, it was predictable that the 
government would turn to harmless error as the only way to 
prevent a massive number of reversals of convictions that were 
obtained in a world ruled by reference to trustworthiness, not 
testimonial statements.  Indeed, harmless error appears alive 
  
 262 No. 2002-DP-01855-SCT, 2005 WL 977007, at *24 (Miss. Apr. 28, 2005); see 
also State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 345-46 (R.I. 2005) (defendant’s use of witness 
statement to police in cross-examination waived confrontation issue on appeal). 
 263 789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 2005). 
 264 Id. at 44. 
 265 Id. at 45. 
 266 See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 790 N.Y.S.2d 723, 726 (App. Div. 2005) (cross-
examination in robbery trial did not leave misleading impression). 
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and well after Crawford.  While one might assume that the 
admission of testimonial statements would be prejudicial 
enough to doom most attempts to demonstrate harmless error, 
many cases have survived reversal on this ground.267 
C. The Role of Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases 
Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to raise claims of 
forfeiture when facing Confrontation Clause challenges by 
opining, 
[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes 
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.268 
Some prosecutors are already arguing that domestic 
violence cases by their nature involve forfeiture when the 
victim does not testify.  They claim defendants invariably 
either actually threaten complainants or, given the 
circumstances of their relationships, such women are afraid 
that their testimony will cause further violence.269  It is likely 
that forfeiture will be a factor in a number of domestic violence 
cases, and prosecutors are correct to worry that the testimonial 
approach gives defendants more incentive to keep women from 
testifying.  However, forfeiture cannot be assumed without 
specific evidence linking a defendant to a complainant’s failure 
to testify at trial.270  In other words, even though empirical 
evidence from the Quincy Project, which tracked court-
restrained male abusers, found high percentages of physical 
and economic threats by abusers to women who cooperated 
with the police as well as threats of loss of children,271 this does 
  
 267 See, e.g., Sparkman v. State, No. CACR 04-268, 2005 WL 1231710 (Ark. Ct. 
App. May 25, 2005) (child abuse); People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL 
941454, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005); State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 81 
(Minn. 2005); Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *11 (Tex. App. 
May 19, 2005) (not yet released for publication); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 851 
(Wash. 2005) (domestic violence cases). 
 268 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 269 See, e.g., Adam Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: 
Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14, 
15-16 (2004). 
 270 See Hutton, supra note 102, at 72. 
 271 See E.S. BUZAWA & C.G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 88 (James A. Inciardi, 2d ed. 1996) (examined victim, incident, 
abuser, and defendant characteristics for 663 restraining order cases over a two-year 
period). 
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not provide evidence in an individual case connecting the 
defendant to the woman’s failure to appear. 
Crawford cites Reynolds, a witness tampering case, for 
its acceptance of forfeiture.272  It is unclear how broadly 
Reynolds will be interpreted since the actual case involved both 
witness tampering and a declarant who had been previously 
cross-examined.273  Therefore, in light of Crawford’s holding, 
the evidence would have satisfied confrontation without any 
need to invoke forfeiture.  Historically, forfeiture was also 
limited to witness tampering cases.274  Post-Crawford, several 
courts have applied the doctrine to admit statements of 
murdered victims, where witness tampering is not involved.275  
In United States v. Garcia-Meza,276 where the defendant was 
charged with stabbing his wife to death, the Court specifically 
noted that the federal forfeiture hearsay exception’s 
requirement, that the defendant intended to prevent the 
witness from testifying, did not control the constitutional 
analysis of forfeiture. 
It should be noted that in most domestic violence 
murder cases the doctrine is being used constitutionally to 
overcome the testimonial bar rather than to provide a hearsay 
exception, since forfeiture hearsay exceptions are generally 
limited to witness tampering.277  In other words, some other 
exception, such as an excited utterance or a catch-all ensures 
the reliability of the statement.  For example, in People v. 
Moore,278 a domestic violence homicide case, the decedent’s 
statement was admitted as an excited utterance to a police 
officer.  The court found that the victim’s unavailability to 
testify was because of her death and that her death was the 
result of defendant’s action, forfeiting his right to claim a 
confrontation violation.279  State v. Meeks,280 a murder case not 
  
 272 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
158-59 (1879)). 
 273 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 150. 
 274 See generally James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing and Those 
Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other 
Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003); John 
R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.U. L. REV. 835 (1996). 
 275 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, No. A095412, 2005 WL 715973, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Mar. 30, 2005) (summarizing case law). 
 276 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 277 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
 278 117 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
 279 Id. at 11. 
 280 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004). 
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involving domestic violence, where the statement appeared to 
be a dying declaration to a police officer, reached the same 
result.281  The California Supreme Court has granted review to 
determine whether a defendant forfeited his Confrontation 
Clause claim regarding admission of the victim’s prior 
statements concerning an incident of domestic violence because 
the defendant killed the victim, thus rendering her unavailable 
to testify at trial, and whether the doctrine applies where the 
alleged “wrongdoing” is the same as the offense for which the 
defendant was on trial.282 
Is there justification for not requiring witness 
tampering in the forfeiture context when a defendant is 
charged with murder of the declarant?  Crawford left the door 
open to permit a dying declaration exception to the testimonial 
approach.  As a practical matter, many of the forfeiture cases 
fit the same rationale.  The difference is that dying 
declarations are narrowly focused statements made with 
knowledge of impending death, and do not admit the decedent’s 
other relevant hearsay.  In my view, we need to separate the 
forfeiture hearsay exception from the constitutional forfeiture 
doctrine.  The forfeiture hearsay exception should be limited to 
witness tampering because it has the potential to admit 
unreliable evidence.283  However, forfeiture as a constitutional 
doctrine should apply to admit testimonial hearsay that 
otherwise fits an existing exception when the declarant has 
been killed, and evidence identifies the defendant as the 
perpetrator.  The hearsay would already have met a reliability 
check, either by category (e.g., excited utterance) or, if it is an 
ad hoc exception, by a trustworthiness or corroboration 
requirement embedded in the exception. 
However, I question whether totally unreliable hearsay 
should come in by forfeiture, but believe that a constitutional 
witness tampering requirement for cases in which the victim is 
alleged to have been killed by the defendant disserves justice in 
  
 281 Id. at 791, 794-95 (citing Brief for Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24, n.16, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004) (No. 02-9410); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of 
Chutzpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506, 516 (1997)). 
 282 People v. Giles, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004) (statement was admitted 
pursuant to California Evidence Code Section 1370 discussed supra at text 
accompanying note 226). 
 283 See, e.g., Com. v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 n.21 (Mass. 2005) (noting 
that there may be some statements so lacking in reliability that their admission would 
raise due process concerns). 
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the same way that the exclusion of a dying declaration on 
testimonial grounds is not viewed as a constitutional option.  
Particularly in the domestic violence context, the victim is 
likely to be at home, rather than in some public place where 
people would hear her final words.  Thus, prior statements 
concerning her abuse that are otherwise admissible act as the 
equivalent of dying declarations. 
In contrast, constitutional forfeiture of a live declarant 
should require a witness tampering rationale since that nexus 
is necessary for an approach that is not based on a knowing 
waiver, nor is compelled by the historic record.  The problem in 
determining if forfeiture has occurred is that the declarant is 
absent, so we will often not have statements by her 
establishing threats by the defendant.  Studies have found that 
many women do face pressure, but that is not evidence that a 
particular defendant intimidated the witness.  Other reasons 
may cause her absence including: her emotional ties to the 
batterer, the potential loss of financial support for herself and 
her children if he is convicted, or her belief that she can control 
the battering by the use of an arrest without prosecution.  In 
addition, in a growing number of cases, she may worry that her 
batterer’s prosecution will result in her children being placed in 
foster care or in her facing charges of child endangerment.284  
Immigrant women also worry about deportation of their 
spouses or themselves even though changes in 1994 to VAWA 
permit domestic violence victims who are the spouses of 
citizens or permanent residents to apply for permanent 
residency.285 
The Court of Appeals in Hammon v. State286 recognized 
the difficulty of providing evidence of forfeiture.  It questioned 
the definition of “wrongdoing” by a defendant, asking if another 
battery was required, or whether psychological pressure on a 
victim not to cooperate is enough, and if so, how is such 
pressure to be measured?287  Psychological pressure should be 
sufficient since that is how the defendant maintains control of 
  
 284 See sources cited supra note 96.  
 285 See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness 
to Call for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 68, 77-79 (2003); 
Deborah A. Morgan, Comment, Access Denied: Barriers to Remedies Under the Violence 
Against Women Act for Limited English Proficient Battered Immigrant Women, 54 AM. 
U. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
 286 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 829 N.E.2d 
444, 453 (Ind. 2005). 
 287 Id. at 951-52 n.3. 
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the battered woman and is a recognized feature of the cycle of 
violence and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).288  These 
pressures often result in a victim’s lack of cooperation.  Thus, 
in determining forfeiture, evidence that a woman suffers from 
PTSD should be considered a significant factor.  Previous 
history should also be factored into the analysis, including 
prior charges of abuse and any previous recantations by the 
declarant. 
Unfortunately, prosecutors may need to expend more 
resources to obtain evidence of forfeiture in cases involving 
battered, rather than dead, victims.  This could require sending 
an advocate or officer to talk to the complainant or to neighbors 
who may have information.  Adam Krischer has provided a 
number of valuable suggestions about obtaining evidence to 
support forfeiture.289  For example, phone records subpoenaed 
from jail may reveal tapes or explain a recantation at trial.  
Voicemail messages, e-mail, or caller ID logs indicating large 
numbers of calls may also be useful.  However, it is unclear 
whether such resources would be available for misdemeanors, 
which encompass a large percentage of the domestic violence 
caseload. 
The forfeiture decision is a preliminary fact question for 
the judge, so unless state practice requires admissible evidence, 
the court can consider hearsay in its determination.  Because 
forfeiture can have a significant impact at trial, a few states 
require clear and convincing evidence for the preliminary 
showing.  However, this standard is no longer favored in 
constitutional analysis.  Since voluntariness of confessions and 
Miranda violations are determined by a preponderance of the 
evidence,290 it is difficult to argue that forfeiture requires a 
higher standard, whether in a hearsay exception or for 
constitutional purposes.  Indeed, the only constitutional right 
that currently appears to impose a clear and convincing 
evidence standard is found in the nearly forty-year-old decision 
of United States v. Wade.291 
  
 288 See generally Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 16. 
 289 Krischer, supra note 269, at 15. 
 290 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (Miranda); Lego v. Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972) (voluntariness). 
 291 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (independent evidence that an identification was based 
on observations of the suspect other than at the improperly held pretrial lineup). 
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D. Rehabilitating a Recanting Witness 
When the complainant recants, besides the use of prior 
inconsistent statements, and admissible hearsay,292 counsel 
should consider expert evidence to explain the effects of the 
cycle of violence.  I have argued elsewhere that this evidence 
should not be limited to BWS testimony.293  It is difficult for 
jurors and even judges to understand why a woman would lie 
in court and subject herself to potential perjury charges to 
protect the person who battered her.  A judge explained: 
One of your prosecutors said something to me that really helped my 
view.  It relates to what you’re talking about, what you see at ground 
zero when the officer is out there and then what the victims do later.  
She said that we all have to recognize that it’s easier for the victim 
to lie to us, the judge, the prosecutor, the lawyers, than it is for her 
to lie to her abuser.294 
In addition, prosecutors should consider obtaining 
information such as that suggested by Adam Krischer in 
supporting claims of forfeiture.295  For example, subpoenaing 
phone records from jail may reveal tapes that explain why a 
victim recanted.  Voicemail messages, e-mail, or caller ID logs 
indicating large numbers of calls may also be useful.  In People 
v. Martinez,296 the tape and transcript of the victim’s 
conversation with the defendant and her son-in-law during a 
jail visit after the preliminary hearing disclosed the defendant 
repeatedly apologizing and her repeatedly telling him she loved 
and needed him.  They talked about how to get this incident 
behind them and reunite and her son-in-law said the two of 
them would have to “get a story going and . . . make sure it 
sounds right.”297  While the legal basis for the impeachment 
was not mentioned, it appears to go to the issue of bias, which 
would permit extrinsic evidence. 
  
 292 No confrontation problem exists when the declarant testifies at trial.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Green, 125 Fed. Appx. 659, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (because domestic 
violence complainant testified at trial, no need to determine if her 911 statements were 
testimonial in nature). 
 293 See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 16, at 150; Raeder, The Double-
Edged Sword, supra note 16, at 816. 
 294 Feature: A Roundtable Discussion on Domestic Violence, 42 HOUSTON LAW. 
24, 32 (2004) (quoting Judge Warne). 
 295 Krischer, supra note 269, at 15. 
 296 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 297 Id. 
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VII. REVISIONING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTORIAL 
MODEL BY ADOPTING A MULTI-TRACK SYSTEM 
As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, while 
society has recently devoted substantial resources to 
eliminating domestic violence, the combination of practical and 
constitutional constraints on holding batterers accountable 
justifies reconsidering the role of the criminal justice system in 
combating domestic violence.  For at least a decade, 
uncooperative complainants have been viewed as a problem, 
and the criminal justice response to domestic violence as the 
panacea.  While dangerous batterers must be held accountable, 
it is unclear that we are using our limited resources wisely in 
misdemeanors.  Even more distressing, we appear not to be 
able to easily distinguish the truly dangerous offenders from 
those who are a lesser threat and are also more likely to be 
reeducated.298  In a time frame of limited public resources, we 
cannot do more with less, particularly in the post-Crawford 
era.  Thus, we must be smarter about identifying dangerous 
offenders, changing the process and penalties for 
misdemeanants, and bettering the lives of women and children 
by making sure they are survivors, rather than victims.  I view 
my suggestions as consistent with the long standing trend 
towards “coordinated community response,”299 which combines 
prosecutorial and private resources to better serve battered 
women.  Indeed, much of what I advocate is not new,300 but is 
simply more focused on a criminal justice response in the wake 
of Crawford, when it has become clear that the “evidence” 
based prosecutorial approach is no longer the best strategy. 
However, before reaching the question of how domestic 
violence cases should be categorized, we must evaluate how 
  
 298 See Sack, supra note 88, at 1736 (discussing studies). 
 299 See id. at 1725-36. 
 300 See generally id.  See also THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT 
ADMINISTRATORS (“COSCA”), POSITON PAPER ON SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: STATE 
COURTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Nov. 2004) (discussing problems and approaches 
and providing a blueprint for judicial action that includes adopting statewide models 
for domestic violence courts, a plan for a multi-jurisdictional response, multi-agency 
partnerships, sufficient resources, judicial training, and a National Plan), available at 
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/PositionPapers/SafetyAccountability-DomesticViolence-Nov-
04.pdf [hereinafter COSCA Report].  Based on the report, the Conference of Chief 
Justices agreed to establish a national action plan concerning domestic violence 
(Resolution 32 adopted Jan. 2005, available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/ 
DomesticViolenceResolutions/SafetyandAccountabilityStateCourtsandDomesticViolenc
e.pdf). 
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mandatory arrest and no-drop policies are working.301  Can the 
police really identify the primary offender, or are they simply 
arresting both parties?  Similarly, is there empirical data about 
how many women really lose their children to foster care or are 
being charged with child endangerment due to their 
victimization?  What are the relative advantages and 
disadvantages for women and the system in obtaining criminal 
versus civil protective orders; what type of enforcement should 
be provided for a breach; and how does Crawford impact the 
decision for a civil rather than criminal remedy?  While mutual 
protective orders have been very problematic for women, 
current practice sometimes makes this the easy option and 
gives some batterers a legal weapon to be used against their 
victims.  No one wants to return to days when domestic 
violence was ignored, but if battered women are being 
disadvantaged by the policies that were instituted on their 
behalf, it is time to reassess whether the best policies are in 
place.  Since there is a good deal of literature and some 
empirical data on both sides of the divide,302 one possibility is to 
  
 301 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, 
Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 281 (1997); Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim 
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 159 (2003); 
Holly Maguigan, Wading Into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between 
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, Violence, 
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427 (2003); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: 
A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest 
Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 183 (1997); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic 
Batterer Through Legislation: Will it Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709 (2004); 
Jessica Dayton, Note, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No 
Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 281, 
284-85 (2003); Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for 
Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 
52 DRAKE L. REV. 295 (2004). 
 302 See, e.g., ANGELA GOVER et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LEXINGTON COUNTY 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: A PARTNERSHIP AND EVALUATION (NCJ 204023) (2004), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204023.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMIZATION RESEARCH DIVISION, COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH ON 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1993-2004 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
nij/vawprog/vaw_portfolio.pdf;  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH:  SUMMARIES FOR 
JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS (NCJ 202564) (Barabara Smith ed., 2003), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF JUST., LEGAL 
INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
(NCJ 171666) (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171666.pdf; VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN AND FAMILY VIOLENCE: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY (NCJ 199701) (Bonnie Fisher, ed., 2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/199701.pdf.  See generally JEFFREY FAGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT (NCJ 157641), THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles/crimdom.pdf. 
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create a government-sponsored National Conference or 
Commission that would include representatives of the major 
stakeholders in the domestic violence criminal justice 
community, whose mission would be to go beyond a discussion 
of best practices, and instead struggle with the difficult task of 
drafting principles or model legislation that promote uniform 
policy and standards.303 
In terms of prosecution, I propose that the traditional 
criminal justice track be divided into three separate tracks.  
Ideally, all domestic violence cases would be kept together, 
regardless of the track.304  In other words, simply prosecuting 
some cases as felonies, rather than misdemeanors, will not be 
optimal if the cases are dispersed among prosecutors and 
judges.  Also, victim advocates are required to ensure the cases 
do not get lost and that necessary services are provided.  The 
Risky Violent Offender Track would apply to cases resulting in 
death, rape or other serious physical injuries, weapons-based 
offenses, multiple victim abusers, defendants with previous 
convictions, and defendants who meet defined criteria of 
dangerousness.  It would provide a social service network to 
surviving battered women and their children.  Advocates would 
help them navigate the court system and encourage their 
cooperation.  Early preliminary hearings would be set in 
felonies to provide an opportunity for cross-examination to 
minimize the loss of key evidence if the woman refuses to 
testify at trial.  Misdemeanors would be set within thirty to 
forty-five days to ensure the greatest likelihood of obtaining the 
complainant’s testimony.  Women would be subpoenaed, but 
material witness or bench warrants would be issued only in the 
most serious cases, which would be determined by protocols.  
Advocates would also help document evidence of forfeiture and 
look for additional sources of evidence that might be suggested 
by phone records, or transcripts of jailhouse visit conversations. 
Federal as well as state weapons-based offenses would 
be considered for the Risky Violent Offender Track, because 
these are often both easier to prove and carry significant 
  
 303 Cf. COSCA Report, supra note 300.  My suggestion for a National 
Conference is somewhat broader than that proposed by the Conference of Chief 
Justices since it encompasses law enforcement as well as judicial responses. 
 304 For discussion of a dedicated high volume misdemeanor domestic violence 
court, see Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: 
The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
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penalties.305  Charging federal felonies specifically targeting 
domestic violence should also be more vigorously encouraged.306  
Working relationships should be set up between federal and 
state prosecutors, so that appropriate state violators can be 
referred for federal weapons or kidnapping prosecutions, as 
well as for interstate domestic violence offenses.  The initial 
challenge will be to correctly identify risky offenders who have 
the potential to escalate violence and pose a significant threat 
to the lives of the complainants.  Formulas to aid in such 
identification currently exist and standards should be 
developed on a national level to ensure the best research and 
uniformity of practice.307 
States should also review their evidence rules to ensure 
the admission of appropriate expert testimony concerning the 
effects of battering.308  If necessary, Rule 404(b) should be 
amended to admit prior domestic violence evidence as to the 
same victim.309  As I have argued elsewhere, propensity 
evidence should not be allowed, but motive, plan, and identity 
evidence should be widely received.  As previously mentioned, a 
broad domestic violence hearsay exception should be enacted.  
Counseling and social services for the women, including advice 
on employment and educational options should be provided.  
Coordination between social services and criminal justice 
victim services should also be encouraged.  If the criminal 
justice system cannot actually provide these services, it should 
be able to refer women to existing social programs, so they do 
not have to find their own way through the different 
bureaucracies. 
The remaining cases would be divided into two tracks, 
again within a system where domestic violence cases are kept 
together.  One track would be diversionary for offenders with 
  
 305 Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 
599-600 (2003). 
 306 See, e.g., DUROSE, supra note 68, at 51 (from 2000-2002, only 757 suspects 
were referred for federal prosecution for violations of federal domestic violence laws). 
 307 See, e.g., Judge Amy Karan et al., A Lawyer’s Guide to Assessing 
Dangerousness for Domestic Violence, 78 FLA. B.J. 55 (Mar. 2004); JANICE ROEHL ET 
AL., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT VALIDATION STUDY: THE RAVE 
STUDY PRACTITIONER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS:  VALIDATION OF TOOLS FOR 
ASSESSING RISK FROM VIOLENT INTIMATE PARTNERS, (NCJ 209732) (May 2005), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209732.pdf.  
 308 See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 16, at 151, 160; see also Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Batterering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 999-1002 (2004). 
 309 See Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1505; see also 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 308, at 989-98. 
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no more than two arrests and no previous domestic violence 
convictions.  The other track would be for cases in which 
women do not want to press charges from the outset and the 
batterer does not fit whatever violent offender profile is used in 
the jurisdiction.  While there has been discussion about the 
effectiveness of batterer’s programs, the Diversionary Track 
would require completion of an approved anger management 
program that incorporates education about the dynamics of 
battering.  In this regard, more attention must be given to the 
content of such programs to ascertain their effectiveness.310  In 
addition, employment counseling would be available and the 
defendant would be expected to financially provide for his 
family.  Appropriate programs or referrals would be provided 
for the women to better understand their options.  Unlike the 
Risky Violent Offender Track, where an unstated goal is to 
have the woman realize that she and her children ultimately 
need to leave the batterer when it is safe to do so and to 
develop an interim safety plan, the Diversionary Track would 
function like a social service safety net for families that will 
likely remain intact if the violence is stopped.   
The final track would include other cases not fitting 
within either the Risky Violent Offender or Diversionary 
Track.  This Middle Track would mainly consist of 
misdemeanors, but could include felonies with perceived 
evidentiary problems, or where the injury is serious, but the 
defendant does not fit the dangerous offender profile.  It might 
also include cases where the defendant refuses diversion.  In 
my view, even in this track a woman’s decision not to prosecute 
should be honored in light of the literature on victim autonomy 
and the lack of empirical evidence indicating any correlation 
with lessening violence and prosecutorial no-drop policies.311  
The discussion by the Court of Appeals in Fowler on this point 
is instructive: 
  
 310 Amanda Dekki, Note, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for State-
Mandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 
18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549 (2004). 
 311 See, e.g., Eve Buzawa et al., Responses to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active 
Court Setting, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE 
PROFESSIONALS, supra note 302, at 20 (concluding that for first-time offenders and less 
serious cases, courts should honor a victim’s wishes to have the case dismissed); see 
also Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State 
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 569-70 (1999); Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, 
Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects 
on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 318-21 (2004). 
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[J]ust before trial, Officer Decker apparently had threatened A.R. 
with a charge of filing a false police report if she refused to testify 
against Fowler.  The prosecutor also asked the trial court to direct 
A.R. to answer his questions regarding whether Fowler had battered 
her, which the trial court refused to do.  Given the psychological 
complexities of domestic violence cases, it is not at all clear to us that 
such an approach in trying to “encourage” a victim to testify is 
desirable.  One recent scholarly article estimates that between 
eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant their 
accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution.  The reasons 
why a victim might choose to recant or not cooperate are varied and 
complex, including a fear of additional violence by the abuser, a 
belief that the abuser will “change” if no prosecution occurs, and 
legitimate economic concerns if the abuser was the primary financial 
provider and is facing prison time.312 
Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Fowler 
agreed that domestic violence victims should not be placed in 
the situation of being intimidated not only by the batterer, but 
also by the State and its representatives.  However, the 
Indiana Supreme Court also opined that the Court of Appeals 
understated the problem because a threat to file charges for 
making a false crime report is only appropriate if the 
prosecutor has reason to believe the complainant lied, which in 
turn would mean that no prosecution of the defendant is 
proper.313  Ultimately, the goal for the Middle Track should be 
to provide social services and encourage women to leave the 
batterer or create viable safety plans, and to cooperate with the 
criminal prosecution.  Similar to the timing for the Risky 
Violent Offender Track, misdemeanors should be set for trial 
within thirty to forty-five days to ensure the maximum 
possibility of cooperation by the victim.   
Beyond a tracking system, Professor Donna Coker has 
suggested that spending VAWA money to increase the 
economic resources available to women might provide better 
results than our current prosecutorial practices.314  Resort to 
  
 312 Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Tom 
Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003)); see also United States v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 886 
(7th Cir. 2004) (Defendant convicted of possession of a firearm conviction, which was 
reversed due to the admission of the defendant’s estranged wife’s statement pursuant 
to a residual exception.  In Gilbert, the wife attempted to recant the statements shortly 
after the search, claiming that the officers had threatened her and that she feared she 
would lose her five children.).  
 313 829 N.E.2d 459, 471 (Ind. 2005). 
 314 Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic 
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 858 (2001); see also Donna 
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mediation and restorative justice reconciliation approaches 
should be carefully considered, but only employed in 
circumstances where the complainant would not be 
disadvantaged.315  Ultimately, we need to empower women and 
provide families with opportunities to help them reinvision 
their own lives.   
The criminal justice system has an important role in 
stopping family violence, punishing risky offenders, providing 
disincentives for misdemeanor batterers, and giving 
appropriate defendants a chance to turn around their lives 
through diversion.  In many places, though, we seem to be 
merely going through the motions.  Most domestic violence 
cases are treated as misdemeanors, and those batterers who 
are arrested and jailed tend to receive short jail terms, without 
regard to whether this makes them more dangerous or 
conversely more likely to lose their jobs.  Complainants’ wishes 
also tend to be devalued, with little assistance either to the 
women or to the family unit.  We should view Crawford as an 
opportunity to re-evaluate how the system is working, fix 
whatever is broken, and not be afraid to try new approaches to 
ensure a better life for women and children at risk. 
VIII. CHILD ABUSE 
A. The Empirical Evidence Concerning Child Abuse 
Like domestic violence, the explosion in child abuse 
prosecutions is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Prior to 1963, 
child abuse reporting laws were nonexistent, but by 1967, each 
of the fifty states had enacted mandatory reporting of child 
abuse laws.316  In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse 
  
Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic Rights, 24 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 187-89 (Summer/Fall 2003). 
 315 See, e.g., Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of 
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117 (1993); C. Quince 
Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems 
and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 295-96 (2004); Jane C. Murphy & 
Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of 
Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53 (Spring 2005); Smith, supra note 104; 
Dekki, supra note 310; Alana Dunnigan, Comment, Restoring Power to the Powerless: 
The Need to Reform California’s Mandatory Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence, 
37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1031 (2003); Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of Mediation in 
Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235 (2002).  
 316 NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING 
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Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), which required 
states to mandate the reporting of child abuse and demonstrate 
the existence of specific programs and procedures in order to 
qualify for possible federal grants under the Act.317  Most states 
specify which professionals are required to report, increasing 
the list of mandatory reporters to include nurses, dentists, 
social workers, school personnel, child care providers, law 
enforcement officers, clergymen, and even pharmacists, 
firefighters, and paramedics.  Approximately eighteen states 
require any person who suspects abuse to report it to the 
proper authorities.318 
While the domestic violence statistics dwarf those for 
child abuse, these cases grip the public because they involve 
exploitation of the most vulnerable victims.  The introductory 
findings to the 2003 revision of CAPTA state that each year, 
approximately 900,000 American children are victims of abuse 
and neglect, and that approximately nineteen percent of those 
children suffered physical abuse, ten percent suffered sexual 
abuse, and five percent suffered emotional maltreatment.319  
Defying many perceptions, a third of child victimizers in state 
prison had committed their crime against their own child and 
half had a relationship with the victim as a friend, 
acquaintance, or other relative.320  Thirty percent reported they 
had multiple victims.321  Three-quarters of the violent 
victimizations of children took place in either the victim or 
offender’s home.322 
Child abuse cases are often difficult for prosecutors to 
win because the abuse takes place in secret, there is typically 
no physical evidence of abuse in molestation cases not 
  
LAWS 1 (2002) [hereinafter CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING 
LAWS]. 
 317 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119).  
 318 See CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS, supra 
note 316; Asaph Glosser et al., The Lewin Group, Statutory Rape: A Guide to State 
Laws and Reporting Requirements 12 (2004), available at http://www.lewin.com/ 
Lewin_Publications/Human_Services/StateLawsReport.htm. 
 319 Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-36, 117 Stat. 
800 (amending CAPTA); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 2003, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm03/ 
cm2003.pdf.  
 320 LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHILD VICTIMIZERS:  
VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 10 (1996), available at http://www.usdoj/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoat.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2005). 
 321 Id. at 9. 
 322 Id. at 12. 
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involving penetration, and even rape may not provide physical 
evidence because children heal quickly and the crime is often 
reported well after it occurred.  The fact that children disclose 
in stages also increases the likelihood of inconsistencies in the 
child’s testimony.  In addition, questioning by a family 
member, doctor, psychologist, or police officer may be perceived 
as leading, producing unreliable answers.  Like domestic 
violence victims, children often recant.  Thus, the testimony of 
young children is viewed more skeptically by jurors than that 
of adults because of concerns over suggestibility, manipulation, 
coaching, or confusing fact with fantasy.323  Similarly, a study 
by Professor Myers, a leading expert concerning child abuse, 
noted a higher reversal for hearsay introduced in child abuse 
than other types of cases.324 
Unlike domestic violence, some argue that Crawford 
will have a minimal impact on child abuse trials because such 
cases may not be winnable in the absence of the child, and 
therefore prosecutors had always been selective in their choice 
of cases.  For example, another study by Professor Myers of 
forty-two child sexual abuse trials found that child witnesses 
testified live in court in each trial, “suggesting that prosecutors 
are reluctant to take child sexual abuse cases to trial unless 
the victim is available to testify.”325  In this regard, Maryland v. 
Craig permits prosecutors to have some children testify from a 
different location via some type of television arrangement or 
simply placed in the courtroom with a screening device, if they 
can demonstrate particularized need showing that the child 
would be fearful of testifying in the defendant’s presence.326  To 
the extent that Crawford does not result in revisiting Craig, 
this also ensures cross-examination for testimonial statements.  
While empirical data appears to suggest that when children 
are shielded their reliability increases, the downside is that the 
jury may find the child less credible.327 
  
 323 See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Ohio’s Efforts to Protect Children Without Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal 
Defendants—Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause 
Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1994) [hereinafter Raeder, 
Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis]. 
 324 John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of 
Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 44-45 (2002). 
 325 John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999).  
 326 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990). 
 327 See Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with 
Social Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 238-39 (2002). 
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Over the years, a number of decisions have involved 
absent child witnesses, including two of the most important 
Roberts’ progeny: Wright and White.  Generally, children may 
be deemed incompetent due to an inability to discern truth 
from falsity, or because they cannot communicate with the 
jury.  In addition, some prosecutors, parents, and psychologists 
believe that requiring a child to testify revictimizes the child 
and inflicts additional trauma that may result in slowing the 
child’s recovery.  While the empirical basis for this claim is not 
decisive,328 many believe that children should only be subjected 
to cross-examination when there is no other viable 
alternative.329  Ironically, some children recover more quickly 
when the jury validates their testimony by convicting the 
defendant, and are retraumatized by an acquittal, factors not 
part of any Confrontation Clause analysis.330 
Whether or not the child testifies, child abuse cases, like 
domestic violence cases, rely heavily on excited utterances and 
exceptions for medical diagnosis and treatment.  However, 
even given expansive interpretations of those exceptions, when 
a child is the declarant, virtually every state has a child 
hearsay exception, or uses a catch-all to permit hearsay that 
would otherwise be barred.  Twenty states allow such 
exceptions regardless of whether the child-witness is or is not 
available to testify; four states allow the exceptions only if the 
child is available to testify; and eight states allow the 
exceptions only if the child is unavailable to testify.331  Some 
states have also adopted exceptions that apply to the 
videotaping of child interviews typically by law enforcement, 
psychologists, social workers or others employed by the local 
child services agency.332  This is designed to show juries that 
  
 328 See, e.g., Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses after 
Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993 (1992) (surveying psychological literature); 
see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, 1 MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER 
ABUSE CASES 135 (2005) (discussing psychological research). 
 329 See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for 
Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1990) (challenging the stereotype 
that claims “[f]or most victims, confrontation with the legal system is a second and 
separate trauma, a process of revictimization”).  
 330 See, e.g., Rachel I. Wollitzer, Sixth Amendment - Defendant’s Right to 
Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault 
Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 785-86 (1988); Cecchettini-Whaley, supra 
note 328, at 2005 (surveying psychological literature). 
 331 TASK FORCE ON CHILD WITNESSES, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUST. 
SECTION, THE CHILD WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES 40 (2002). 
 332 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02. 
(2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 492.304; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (2005).  
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the child has not been mislead by suggestive questioning 
techniques, when the child does not testify. 
B. The Effect of Mandatory Reporting Requirements 
Regardless of which exception the hearsay is admitted 
under, after Crawford, if a child does not testify, the deciding 
factor for confrontation analysis is whether the statement is 
considered testimonial.  This is complicated by a characteristic 
not as prevalent in domestic violence cases: the existence of 
mandatory reporting of child abuse in all fifty states.333  Most 
states specify which professionals are required to report, and 
many have increased the list of mandatory reporters to include 
nurses, dentists, social workers, school personnel, childcare 
providers, law enforcement officers, clergymen, and even 
pharmacists, firefighters, and paramedics.334  As previously 
mentioned, approximately eighteen states require any person 
who suspects abuse to report it to the proper authorities.335 
Ironically, after years of being troubled by arguably 
unreliable child hearsay being admitted pursuant to White, my 
difficulty with Crawford is not that hearsay accusing a 
defendant will be received as nontestimonial because the child 
is too young to understand its accusatory content.  Now, any 
child hearsay coming in under an ad hoc exception will 
typically require trustworthiness and if shoehorned into a 
tradition exception, the defendant is no worse off than under 
White.  Instead, I am distressed that a testimonial approach 
undoes the entire way in which we currently approach child 
abuse cases.336  In other words, mandatory reporting arguably 
makes any reporter a government proxy, virtually excluding all 
hearsay of unavailable children.  I have been surprised that 
some courts make no mention of these statutes in analyzing 
whether a child’s statements are testimonial.  For example, in 
State v. Vaught the statement of a victim to a physician that 
“[defendant] put his finger in her pee-pee” was not considered 
testimonial.337 
  
 333 See generally CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING 
LAWS, supra note 316, at 1. 
 334 Id. at 3-4. 
 335 Id. at 4-5, 5 n.16. 
 336 See Hutton, supra note 102, at 70-71. 
 337 682 N.W.2d 284, 286, 291 (Neb. 2004); accord State v. Scacchetti, 690 
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (statement to nurse practitioner who identified 
child after emergency room physician suspected abuse). 
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Similarly, in People v. Cage, a case involving an older 
child who suffered a substantial cut in a dispute with his 
mother, the court found statements made to a doctor were 
nontestimonial because the objective reasonable person test 
asks whether a reasonable person would have expected his 
statements to the doctor to be used prosecutorially.338  The Cage 
court viewed the possibility that someone would pass 
information to police as not enough, completely ignoring that in 
many jurisdictions the doctor has an obligation to report 
physical as well as sexual abuse of children.  Indeed the 
Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Guide suggests that 
to encourage reluctant physicians to get involved in cases of 
abuse, they should be reminded that “all 50 States and the 
District of Columbia have enacted legislation regarding 
immunity from civil or criminal liability for persons who, in 
good faith, make or participate in making a report of child 
abuse or neglect.”339 
I have always questioned the admissibility of a 
statement by a child abuse victim attributing fault to a 
member of the victim’s immediate household under the medical 
exception.  However, many states view such statements as 
relevant to the prevention of recurrence of injury to the child.340  
Therefore, I am not troubled that such statements would likely 
be suppressed under a true testimonial approach. 
In contrast, more traditional symptoms and descriptions 
of medical problems may now be transformed into testimonial 
statements unless courts view the accusation narrowly as just 
including the identification of the perpetrator, as opposed to 
explaining the nature of the injuries caused.  In re T.T.,341 made 
this distinction and considered statements as nontestimonial 
where they did not accuse or identify the perpetrator of the 
assault.  Therefore, the child’s explanation of how she was 
penetrated, descriptions of the pain, and the offender’s use of a 
lubricant were relevant in assessing how the doctor reached 
her opinion that G.F. sustained sexual abuse and was in accord 
  
 338 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 
2004). 
 339 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUST. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 8 (reprint 2001) (1997). 
 340 State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Blake v. State, 933 
P.2d 474, 477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) (“[A]n overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, including 
at least thirty-two states and four federal circuits, allow into evidence statements 
regarding the identity of the perpetrator in child physical or sexual assault cases.”). 
 341 815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
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with the statutory hearsay exception for statements, made by a 
patient with a selfish interest in treatment, for the purpose of 
medical diagnosis and treatment: 
Those statements were not accusatory against respondent at the 
time made and, thus, do not trigger enhanced protection under the 
confrontation clause.  Respondent’s primary focus on G.F.’s entire 
statement to Dr. Lorand as testimonial, because an objective witness 
would reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at 
a later trial, misses the mark.  Such an analysis overlooks the 
crucial “witnesses against” phrase of the confrontation clause and 
casts too wide a net in categorizing nonaccusatory statements by 
sexual assault victims to medical personnel as implicating the 
confrontation clause’s core concerns regarding government 
production of ex parte evidence against a criminal defendant.342 
Not all courts agree.  In People v. Vigil,343 a child’s 
hearsay statements to a physician were deemed testimonial 
where the physician questioned the child and was a member of 
a child protection team and a frequent prosecution witness in 
child abuse cases.  As a result, the doctor could only testify 
regarding his observations and physical findings.  State v. 
Fisher344 attempted to harmonize some of the conflicting cases 
by noting a distinction as to whether the statements to a 
physician are made for forensic as opposed to treatment 
purposes, but overlooked the effect of mandatory reporting 
requirements in its analysis.  While I would expect the defense 
bar to argue that statements to all mandatory reporters are 
testimonial, an absolute ban on all statements made to medical 
personnel concerning child abuse would be quite troubling.  
Looking to the nature of the statement appears more in 
keeping with Crawford when the physician is not part of a 
prosecutorial forensic team or otherwise motivated to obtain an 
accusatory statement. 
C. Children Aren’t Required to Understand the Accusatory 
Effect of Their Statements 
Although it has been argued that the developmental 
literature indicates that young children do not reasonably 
understand that statements made in forensic interviews would 
  
 342 Id. 
 343 104 P.3d 258, 265-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04SC532, 
2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004). 
 344 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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be used at trial,345 courts appear to be using the objective 
observer standard, rather than focusing on the child’s 
expectations.  While State v. Snowden346 imposed an objective 
person test, it rejected use of an objective child, which would 
have insulated “statements by a young child made in an 
environment and under circumstances in which the 
investigators clearly contemplated use of the statements at a 
later trial.” Snowden called such an approach “an exception 
that we are not prepared to recognize.” People v. Sisavath also 
rejected the notion that “an ‘objective witness’ should be taken 
to mean an objective witness in the same category of persons as 
the actual witness—here, an objective four-year-old.”347 
Even disclosures to close family members could be 
considered testimonial under the objective observer approach.  
For example, the In re E.H.348  court found complaints to the 
children’s grandmother were testimonial because they were the 
impetus for filing the petition against E.H. and were 
accusatory statements offered at trial.  In contrast, People v. 
R.F.349 made a blanket holding that statements of a child to 
family members are not testimonial.  The California Supreme 
Court in People v. Griffin also noted that a child victim’s 
statements to a friend at school were not testimonial and 
provided no further explanation.350  State v. Purvis351 noted that 
the fact that parents turn over information about crimes to the 
police “does not transform their interactions with their children 
into police investigations.”352  Given the tendency of many 
courts to treat statements to private individuals as 
nontestimonial regardless of the type of case,353 it may be that a 
  
 345 Allie Phillips, Child Forensic Interviews after Crawford v. Washington: 
Testimonial or Not?, 39 PROSECUTOR 17 (Aug. 2005) (arguing for a reasonable child 
standard and rejecting an objective person standard for children under the age of 10). 
 346 867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005). 
 347 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004); accord State v. Grace, 111 
P.3d 28, 38 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005). 
 348 823 N.E.2d 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), cert. granted, No. 100202, 2005 Ill. 
LEXIS 814 (May 25, 2005).   
 349 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 350 93 P.3d 344, 372 n.19 (Cal. 2004). 
 351 829 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 352 Id. at 579. 
 353 See, e.g., State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1145 n.21 (Conn. 2005) (finding 
a statement of a two-and-a-half-year-old victim to mother was not testimonial); 
Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a 
spontaneous statement of three year old child to mother was not testimonial, nor was 
repetition of that statement to father minutes later); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811, 
 
2005] REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO  381 
significant amount of child hearsay will still be admissible 
because family members are typically the ones to whom abuse 
is originally disclosed. 
D. Crawford’s Impact on Multidisciplinary Forensic Teams 
Crawford appears to undo the use of multidisciplinary 
teams in child abuse, which the Department of Justice has 
encouraged for the last ten years.  In this approach “[s]ocial 
workers, physicians, therapists, prosecutors, judges and police 
officers all have important roles to play.”354  Interagency 
protocols are encouraged with guidelines indicating the role of 
each of the principal agencies.355  Indeed, this effort has been 
extremely successful.  More than forty states have legislation 
concerning joint investigation and cooperation between law 
enforcement and social services and authorizing 
multidisciplinary teams.356 
Such teams have been instrumental in improving the 
skills of interviewers and reducing the number of interviews.  
Professor Myers indicates that reducing interviews ensures 
that vulnerable children are not put under additional stress 
and lowers the likelihood that unnecessarily suggestive 
questions will be asked.357  Now Crawford has turned these best 
practices into a textbook for creating testimonial statements 
when the child does not testify.  Indeed, statements to a 
Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) agent 
have been found to be testimonial.  “[W]here DCFS works at 
the behest of and in tandem with the State’s Attorney with the 
intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial effort of an 
alleged sexual assault on a child, DCFS functions as an agent 
  
822-23  (Wis. 2005) (discussing general case law and finding statement to girlfriend not 
testimonial). 
 354 LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 1, supra note 339, at 3. 
 355 Id.  See generally THE GREENBOOK NATIONAL EVALUATION TEAM, THE 
GREENBOOK DEMONSTRATION INITIATIVE INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT, at  
app. A (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.thegreenbook.info/documents/ 
Greenbook_Interim_Evaluation_Report_2_05.pdf (listing recommendations from 
federal initiative to address domestic violence and child maltreatment). 
 356 Legislation Mandating or Authorizing the Creation of 
Multidisciplinary/Multi-Agency Child Protection Teams (current  
as of November 5, 2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/ 
statutes_legislation_mandating_multidisciplinary_teams_2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 
2005). 
 357 John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: 
Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 
17 (1996). 
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of the prosecution.”358  Similarly, in In re Rolandis G.,359 where 
the child made a statement describing the sexual abuse to a 
child advocacy worker while a police officer watched through a 
“two-way mirror” the court held that the statement was 
testimonial.360  Most recently, State v. Snowden361 found a 
statement testimonial where it resulted from a joint 
investigation by the Montgomery County Police Department 
and the Child Protective Services for Montgomery County.  
While I do not disagree with these decisions on legal grounds, it 
is clear that we must recognize that statements made to 
multidisciplinary teams will not be admitted unless the child 
testifies.  As a result, we must think about how to ensure such 
testimony or otherwise provide admissible evidence to protect 
our most vulnerable children. 
Similarly, post-Crawford, videotaped interviews by 
forensic teams have generally been found to be testimonial.362  
United States v. Bordeaux363 specifically noted that because the 
statements may also have “a medical purpose does not change 
the fact that they were testimonial, because Crawford does not 
indicate, and logic does not dictate, that multi-purpose 
statements cannot be testimonial.” Professor Mosteller has 
discussed the possibility that videotaped interviews will fall 
into disuse since they will not provide an avenue for admission 
of the child’s statement.364  I am more hopeful, for two reasons.  
First, because such statutes typically apply to children who 
testify as well as to those who do not, the prosecutor will still 
have an incentive to bolster the credibility of testifying children 
by showing their interviews were nonsuggestive.  While I 
recognize the counter to this is that prosecutors may want to 
hide suggestive interviews, I think that jurors may question 
  
 358 In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 801 (2004). 
 359 817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 360 Id. at 188. 
 361 867 A.2d 314, 330 (Md. 2005). 
 362 See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. 
granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec 20, 2004);  In re R.A.S., 111 P.3d 
487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (child victim’s statements to police investigator during 
forensic interview were testimonial); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (en banc) 
(child witness’s statements to government caseworker during police-directed interview 
were testimonial).  But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
(child victim’s response to interviewer’s question was not testimonial where 
interviewer was not government employee), cert denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (2004).  See 
also State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 775-76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (summarizing child 
abuse cases). 
 363 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 364 Mosteller, supra note 14, at 529-30. 
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the absence of videotapes when the technology is available.  
Moreover, I do not believe that prosecutors want to manipulate 
children into believing they are abused if in fact they are not, 
and they have an interest in ensuring best practices for 
forensic interviews.  Second, the empirical evidence indicates 
that in actual trials, jurors rated the videotaped interview as 
important in their decision to believe the child victim/witness 
at trial.365 
E. Opportunity for Cross-Examination of Child Witnesses 
Post-Crawford, if a child does not testify, the chances of 
winning at trial plummet because significant types of child 
hearsay will be eliminated.  After years of worrying about too 
much child hearsay being admitted via traditional exceptions 
so that it receives no reliability check, I have come full circle 
and wonder how we can provide any justice to abused children 
who do not testify.  Because some of these children are very 
young, they might not meet even minimal competency 
standards.  At least seven states currently provide for victims 
of child abuse to testify without any finding of competency.366  
Yet do these provide for an opportunity for effective cross-
examination?  
This is not an academic issue.  Pre-Crawford, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the admission of cross-examined videotaped 
testimony of a child, finding that the “[i]ncapacity to 
understand the duty to testify truthfully does not automatically 
offend the Confrontation Clause when the witness in question 
is a young child.”367  In contrast, Purvis v. State368 found that a 
witness who is unable to appreciate the obligation to testify 
truthfully cannot be effectively cross-examined for Crawford 
purposes.  The child in Purvis was incompetent due to being 
developmentally disabled.369  This disability did not prevent the 
court from upholding the admission of the child’s 
nontestimonial statements, which were cross-examined at a 
hearing held pursuant to the state’s Protected Persons 
Statute.370  This issue was deferred in State v. Carothers,371 
  
 365 Myers et al., supra note 325. 
 366 Lyon, supra note 8, at 1023. 
 367 Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 368 829 N.E.2d 572, 581 (2005).  
 369 Id. at 577. 
 370 Id. at 584-85. 
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since the court found a confrontation claim to be premature 
where the defendant argued that the four-year-old child would 
be unable to remember and testify at the time of trial as to the 
statements she gave to a child advocate, to law enforcement 
and to her mother.  Obviously, this question is bound to recur 
in other cases. 
Despite Owens, which rejected a confrontation challenge 
for declarants who testify, defendants have sensed that their 
best challenge to a testifying child is to claim that the 
opportunity for cross-examination was not adequate.  United 
States v. Spotted War Bonnet,372 a pre-Crawford opinion, 
indicated that if “a child is so young that she cannot be cross-
examined at all, or if she is ‘simply too young and too 
frightened to be subjected to a thorough direct or cross-
examination’[,] the fact that she is physically present in the 
courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of 
the Clause.” 
Most courts appear to interpret Crawford as not 
requiring memory of all of the particulars of the abuse.  For 
example, State v. McClanahan373 held that a second grader 
subject to substantial cross-examination did not pose a 
confrontation problem.  In other words, the fact that a child’s 
memory may be imperfect does not make her ‘unavailable’ as a 
witness for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  In People 
v. Harless,374 although a child’s memory at the time of trial was 
somewhat selective, her partial failure of recollection did not 
prevent her from explaining her prior statements or preclude 
the jury from assessing her demeanor and determining 
whether her prior statements or her trial testimony was more 
credible.  Accordingly, the defendant was found to have an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.   
Not responding to a handful of questions also does not 
render the child unavailable.375  Although in State v. Yanez,376 
the child did not remember what she told the adults or what 
the defendant did to her, the court found her available for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, permitting the admission of 
  
 371 692 N.W.2d 544, 549 (S.D. 2005). 
 372 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 
 373 No. 50866-1-I, 2004 WL 723283, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2004). 
 374 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
568 (2005). 
 375 State v. McKinney, 699 N.W.2d 471, 480 (S.D. 2005). 
 376 No. A04-276, 2005 WL 894649, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005). 
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her videotaped statements to a social worker and deputy that 
included graphic descriptions of the abuse.  A similar result 
occurred in State v. Price.377 
People v. Sharp378 demonstrates how a seemingly wise 
defense strategy can backfire.  The defense decided to forego 
cross-examination about specifics of the alleged abuse after the 
child failed to respond on direct to the details of the abuse.  
Because the child answered all of the questions the defense 
posed on cross-examination, the court held that her statements 
were governed by Owens, rather than Crawford.379  Sharp left 
open what legal consequences would ensue if she had answered 
some, but not all, of those questions.380  It is troubling that the 
uncommon situation in Owens, of a testifying adult having no 
memory of the incident, may now becoming commonplace when 
young children testify. 
A few post-Crawford cases have found Confrontation 
Clause violations despite the child’s presence at trial.  In People 
v. Couturier,381 limiting the cross-examination of a child witness 
at trial, concerning questions about notes that she wrote to the 
defendant after the alleged abuse saying she loved and missed 
him, violated the defendant’s right of confrontation where there 
was no corroborating physical evidence or witness testimony, 
making the trial a credibility contest.  In re T.T. found a child 
was unavailable to testify after she froze on the stand when 
asked to recount the alleged incidents of abuse.382  Although the 
child responded to general questions from prosecutor about her 
family and school, and explained how she came to be at alleged 
perpetrator’s house on the dates of the alleged assaults, when 
questions became more specific regarding the assaults, she 
stopped answering questions, even after a recess was taken so 
that her mother could console her.383 
Some challenges arise in the context of a child who 
testifies at a preliminary hearing, but not at trial, since 
Crawford permits testimonial statements of an unavailable 
declarant if there was an opportunity for prior cross-
  
 377 110 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 378 825 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
 381 No. 252175, 2005 WL 323680 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2005) vacated, 704 
N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 2005). 
 382 In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 383 Id. at 797-98. 
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examination.  In People v. Osio,384 where a child testified to only 
one of seven counts at the preliminary hearing, the opportunity 
for cross-examination was considered insufficient.  Similarly, in 
Bockting v. Bayer385 the Ninth Circuit recently held that 
admission of a child’s hearsay statement to a detective 
warranted habeas relief where the statement was critical in 
view of the victim’s testimony at the preliminary hearing 
claiming not to remember what happened. 
Although the evolving case law on adequacy of cross-
examination is not necessarily consistent, the findings appear 
highly fact-specific.  Ultimately, a number of children who are 
found incompetent or freeze are rendered voiceless not because 
of their own inability to testify, but because lawyers and judges 
treat these children like mini adults who they assume will 
understand language and concepts that are developmentally 
inappropriate.386  Given Crawford, the goal should not be to 
obtain less child hearsay, or do away with forensic interviews, 
or attempt to avoid the testimonial ban, but rather to make a 
more concerted effort to ensure that children are comfortable in 
the courtroom and able to testify.387 
F. The Intersection of Craig and Crawford 
To the extent that a child is afraid to testify in the 
presence of the defendant, prosecutors must continue to rely on 
Maryland v. Craig.388  So far, there has been no frontal judicial 
attack on Craig even though Crawford clearly has a vision of 
the Confrontation Clause that rejects the type of balancing 
approach that Craig applied.389  It must be remembered, 
however, that Craig requires that the child must be 
“traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the 
presence of the defendant.”390 Thus, where that element is 
unclear, a Confrontation Clause violation will be established.  
It appears that some courts are including any trauma induced 
  
 384 No. H026953, 2005 WL 1231402, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2005). 
 385 399 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 386 See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated Children’s 
Relunctance to Answer Hypothetical Oath-Taking Competency Questions, 25 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2001). 
 387 See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 8, at 1071; ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL 
ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES:  A GUIDE TO CUSTODY AND TORT ACTIONS 312-15 (1999). 
 388 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 389 Id. at 853. 
 390 Id. at 856. 
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by testifying in their evaluation.  For example, the Military 
Rules of Evidence explicitly requires remote testimony for 
children who literally could not meet the Craig standard.391  In 
United States v. Turning Bear,392 a pre-Crawford case, 
testimony via closed circuit television was found to violate the 
Confrontation Clause because the decision was based in part on 
the child’s fear of the jury, rather than of testifying in the 
presence of her father.  This holding was reaffirmed post-
Crawford in United States v. Bordeaux, which also involved 
testimony via closed circuit television that was permitted 
where the child’s fear related in part to testifying in front of a 
jury.393  The court in Bordeaux also noted “‘confrontation’ via a 
two-way closed circuit television is not constitutionally 
equivalent to face-to-face confrontation.”394 
Courts vary significantly about the nature and extent of 
the showing justifying in-court restrictions, as well as who can 
establish it.395  Some judges have even permitted prosecutors to 
make the representation concerning trauma, although one well 
respected commentator has recommended that the judge talk 
to the child.396  Justices Scalia and Thomas have dissented from 
the denial of certiorari in two cases involving interpretation of 
Craig that they characterized as “confrontation-via-TV.”397  In 
one, a fifteen-year-old teenager indicated she was not afraid of 
the defendant, but “can’t be near him.”398  The other protected a 
child whose mother and doctor indicated that the six-year-old 
wanted to testify and because the testimony would be limited 
to another girl’s abuse, not her own, neither expected the child 
to suffer additional emotional distress.399 
  
 391 See Major Edward J. O’Brien, Are Courts Martial Ready for Prime Time? 
Televised Testimony and Other Developments in the Law of Confrontation, 2000 ARMY 
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Social Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 239 n.285 (2002) (citing cases). 
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G. Forfeiture in Child Abuse Cases 
Forfeiture can also play a role in child abuse cases.  
However, the difficulty is that often the child is pressured by 
the parent who is not the defendant, typically the mother.  This 
occurs because the abuse may result in the mother having to 
make a choice of living with her male intimate and having the 
child removed from the home, or giving up the male to retain 
custody of her child.  Because the penalties for child abuse are 
so great, on occasion the family refuses to believe the child.  
Similarly, children who are old enough to understand the 
ramifications of making the complaint may recognize at some 
point that they would rather live at home than be placed in 
foster care.  Another issue that arises concerning forfeiture is 
that most abusers tell the child to keep their relationship a 
secret, and some abusers threaten the child to prevent 
disclosure.400  If the child’s unwillingness to testify results from 
those original threats, the threats should be admissible to 
demonstrate forfeiture even though the tampering was prior to 
disclosure.  However, if the child is otherwise incompetent, the 
coercion does not supply a direct link to any witness tampering 
at trial. 
H. Reassessing the Admission of Child Abuse Evidence 
States have been fairly aggressive in permitting expert 
evidence and prior acts of defendants in child sex abuse cases.  
Advances in medical technology may also produce physical 
evidence of abuse.  However, jurors still expect to hear from the 
child.  Elsewhere, I have discussed what I view as the 
appropriate use of expert testimony and prior acts of criminal 
defendants in child abuse cases,401 but Crawford’s impact 
cannot be overstated in cases where children do not testify.  
Because the multidisciplinary approach to interviewing 
children is an important feature of child abuse litigation, more 
attention must be given to qualifying children as witnesses, 
and preparing them so that they do not freeze when testifying. 
  
 400 See Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington “Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing” Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, 1 REASONABLE 
EFFORTS 3 (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/ 
reasonable_efforts_volume_1_number_3_2004.html. 
 401 See Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis, supra note 323. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Whether Crawford’s impact on domestic violence and 
child abuse prosecutions was intended or not, it is significant.  
Unlike Abigail Adams, the ladies will not sit by quietly asking 
to be remembered.402  Instead, the advocates on behalf of 
battered women and abused children should view Crawford as 
an opportunity to reassess current practices and restructure 
the way in which the criminal justice system responds to these 
cases. 
  
 402 Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS 
FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963)  (“In the new Code of 
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would 
Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your 
ancestors.”). 
